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ABSTRACT
Patron-clientelism or wasta in Jordan is a historically engrained institution that
crosses social, political and economic spheres. For those with sufficient resources to enter
into its system of exchange, patron-clientelism grants access to university admissions,
government privileges and employment. For those without sufficient resources, patronclientelism creates a barrier to entry that sustains the marginalized status of persons from
low socio-economic backgrounds.
Most scholarship about patron-clientelism portrays it as something dynamic,
inherently neither morally constructive nor problematic but with the potential to be both.
By focusing on various historical manifestations of patron-clientelism, such scholarship
detracts attention from its reprehensible effects. Posing as value-free, this literature
implicitly apologizes for patron-clientelism and reinforces the entrenched political and
economic structures it reflects.
To step beyond existing literature surrounding patron-clientelism— the
perpetually expanding but only marginally helpful registry of ways in which it
manifests— requires deeper consideration of its effect. This thesis will argue that in the
case of Jordan, patron-clientelism tends to function in the service of dominant
fundamental social groups and at the expense of subaltern classes. Using Antonio
Gramsci’s civil society, patron-clientelism in Jordan will be shown to operate as a
mechanism of authoritarian resiliency and a means of debilitating oppositional political
ii

currents. By understanding its existing ramifications in depth, potential for redirecting the
function of patron-clientelism toward alternative and oppositional effects can be realized.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Late November protests and those witnessed in Jordan last summer1 remind
observers that reverberations from the Arab Spring continue to shake foundations of
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Shortcomings of basic models of authoritarian
governance indicate their weakening resilience and have been met with intensifying
demands for transparency and accountability. Although defensive democratization— lip
service to economic and political reform— has helped regimes subdue oppositional
political currents, unimproved economic circumstances and increasing popular political
self-consciousness call into question the viability of co-optation strategies as well as the
longevity of authoritarianism.
Underlying these simmering tensions in Jordan exists an entrenched network of
institutions that simultaneously reflect and perpetuate its distinct economic and political
circumstances. These institutions function in favor of the dominant fundamental social
groups so as to sustain the status quo and the subalternity of non-dominant groups. This
has an effect that foments widespread corruption, but more gravely, exclusion of nondominant classes from the political process as well as from access to fundamental rights
and dignity. Patron-clientelism, referred to as wasta in Arabic is the focus of this thesis. It

1

Late November and summer protests refer to those that occurred in 2018.
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offers a strong example of an institution that reflects the political and economic
circumstances in Jordan and frustrates efforts to upend them.
Despite the engrained nature of institutions like patron-clientelism, it is not the
case that efforts to upend economic and political circumstances that leave subalterns in
Jordan marginalized are hopeless. Nor is it the case that the political agency attributable
to institutions like patron-clientelism is impossible to redirect. Rather, as economic
circumstances worsen these possibilities only become more likely. In order bolster
prospects of success for oppositional political currents, understanding how institutions
function in service of the dominant fundamental groups to sustain existing economic and
political circumstances is necessary.
But conversations about revolutionary behavior in the Middle East and prospects
for reconfiguring economic and political circumstances tend to be actor-centric. That is to
say, they tend to present opportunistic accounts of ways in which revolutionary behavior
can manifest and how it has the possibility to affect substantial change. An apt example is
Asef Bayet’s Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. His
argument is that social nonmovements, acts of quiet encroachment, street politics and
inaudible collectives can play a crucial role in instigating political transformation.2 What
Bayet does not consider in depth, however, are the institutions and norms engrained in
political, social and economic life that have greater salience in shaping behavior than the
potential momentum of disconnected, spontaneous and accumulative dissent. This is a

2

A Bayet. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford Press. 2010. p. 15.
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thematic shortcoming in pre and post-Arab Spring scholarship, but one that is possible to
rectify.
Attempts to characterize political and economic circumstances in places like
Jordan so as to understand strategies of the dominant fundamental groups to sustain
them— and revolutionary strategy to oppose them— first require space-centric analysis.3
In other words, one must realize how the process of defending the status quo by dominant
fundamental groups shapes environments from which dissent might be articulated. This
necessarily involves consideration of civil society, a notion of political space tracing back
to Aristotle, which in the broadest terms is understood as an environment involving
associations and non-governmental organizations with political import. Different
theoreticians have presented conflicting definitions of civil society, but one with the
greatest value for the discussion at hand— and one who will provide the theoretical
backbone for this thesis— is Antonio Gramsci.
As will be developed further, Gramsci viewed civil society as a realm interrelated
with political society (government) with the potential to either complement or oppose
political leadership by the dominant fundamental groups. It is the sphere in which dissent
to existing relations of hegemony can be articulated in order that consent to the dominant
fundamental groups be redirected. Civil society, understood on the basis of political
agency attributable to institutions within it, reflects the influence and interests of Jordan’s
dominant fundamental groups— ie. the monarchy, the political elite, influential tribes,

3

Space-centric analysis relates to consideration of how environments shape political behavior. In the case
of Jordan this relates to the way civil society either empowers dissent or solidifies existing political and
economic structures.
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etc. On the other hand, civil society in Jordan also represents a space from which the
possibility for re-education emerges, so that a culture critical of existing economic and
political circumstances can be cultivated and hegemonic reconfiguration can be realized.
Equally important alongside any conversation involving Gramsci’s civil society is
consideration of the cultural frame of mind institutions like patron-clientelism solidify in
support of the dominant fundamental groups. In other words, greater understanding is
needed for ideas and norms people associate with the political process in Jordan because
of their entrenchment in institutions like patron-clientelism. Understanding the general
popular frame of mind toward politics, manipulated by fundamental groups so as to
sustain their dominance, is essential in order to realize how these ideas can be redirected
so as to enable reconfiguration of economic and political circumstances.
This registry of needs for greater understanding of institutions and their effects on
the political process in Jordan represents, in broad terms, the intellectual context from
which this thesis emerges. Having presented some of the key themes to be addressed
here, the more concrete attributes and methodology of this thesis need introduction.
Foremost, here, is acknowledgement that this thesis offers primarily political theory
analysis. It does not pretend to emphasize a comprehensive study of Jordan, but rather
uses political theory to introduce new ways of understanding political, economic and
social life in Jordan. Vice-versa, it also uses circumstances in Jordan to help illuminate a
novel development of Gramscian theory. The purpose for this is two-fold. In the first,
case-study literature surrounding patron-clientelism in Jordan accounts for the bulk of
existing scholarship. Offering further case-study analysis would not provide an especially
4

novel approach to the field. Secondly, theory-based analysis helps explain why and to
what effect patron-clientelism exists as a salient factor in social, political and economic
life in Jordan, stepping beyond the simple and existing registry of ways in which it
manifests.
The fundamental premise of this thesis is that patron-clientelism4 is an institution
that functions to sustain existing relations of hegemony in Jordan, leadership of the ruling
elite and subalternity of non-dominant groups. The position espoused by this thesis is that
current prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan, on one hand exclude
people from political and economic life who do not have the resources required for
entrance into patron-client relations; this sustains the marginalized status of subaltern
groups. On the other hand, patron-clientelism debilitate prospects for popular contestation
of political and economic circumstances by solidifying in the minds of Jordanians ideas
and norms related to how the political process is imagined to function. In order for
political and economic change to be effective in Jordan, patron-clientelism and other
institutions operative in civil society in support of Jordan’s existing dominant
fundamental groups must be dismantled and redirected.
Contemporary scholarship surrounding patron-clientelism would disagree with
the notion that patron-clientelism in Jordan is unequivocally harmful. It argues, generally
speaking, that the manifestations of patron-clientelism are diverse and dynamic; and so,
where patron-clientelism exists as a problematic in particular places and times, elsewhere

4

The relationship between someone who has authority, status, wealth or some other personal resource and
someone else who benefits from their support or influence in exchange for payment, favors or loyalty.
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it might be constructive. While it is true and there are prospects for redirecting the
trajectory of political agency attributable to patron-clientelism and other institutions
operative in civil society in Jordan, the shortcoming of this position is that it avoids
making concrete value statements that identify moral wrongs when and where they exist.
It is the position of this thesis that current manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan
reflect a moral wrong and any scholarship about patron-clientelism that does not
condemn its harmful expressions makes an apology for them.
Following a literature review, the third chapter of this thesis will argue that
scholarship about politics necessarily carries with it an either explicit or implicit value
judgements. Marx’s comments on moral objectivity will be used to develop a barometer
supportive of claims that patron-clientelism in Jordan represents a moral wrong. The third
chapter is intended to demonstrate a kind of self-consciousness reflected by this thesis, an
awareness of how it would see itself in relation to other scholarship and the moral
argument it hopes to persuasively present. Also important in this section will be a brief
reflection on the role of intellectuals and education in either serving existing
arrangements of political and cultural hegemony or opposing them.
The fourth chapter of this thesis provides in-depth analysis of Antonio Gramsci’s
civil society so as to build conceptual understanding for the role of patron-clientelism in
Jordanian civil society. The fundamental argument of this section is that civil society is
characterized more so on the basis of political agency attributable to operative institutions
and relations within it than on the basis of its distinction or location apart from political
society. This also will be important to develop the idea that patron-clientelism not only
6

reflects the nature of civil society, but also overarching cultural hegemony in Jordan.
Themes from Gramsci to advance this argument relate to the complexity of civil
society— that is, the essential value of understanding complexity in civil society in order
to understand how fundamental groups use civil society to reinforce their dominance.
Necessity of unification and universalization is the second key theme which is used to
explain the role of organic intellectuals to expand interests beyond their corporate origins
and affect substantial change. Here a look at Gramsci’s comments on the Italian south
will be helpful to suggest certain types of economic circumstances lead themselves to
certain types of societal organization and the prominence of particular organizing factors
over others. The third theme will relate to the cultivation of a critical culture and means
through which existing hegemonic configurations can be challenged.
The fifth chapter will attempt to bring all conceptual themes from preceding
chapters together with vignettes descriptive of Jordan’s economic circumstance and the
effects of manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan. These will center primarily on
the role of patron-clientelism within Jordan’s education system, how it relates to Jordan’s
economic circumstance, debilitates civil society and empowers the ruling elite. This
section will also make the argument that opportunity exists for the redirection of patronclientelism so that instead of supporting the dominant fundamental groups in Jordan it
can be used to champion the subaltern classes and affect overarching bottom-up
economic and political change.
This is the roadmap for the following pages. If done right, this thesis should
demonstrate why prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism present an unequivocal
7

moral wrong in Jordan. It should also show how patron-clientelism sustains the
marginalized status of subaltern groups and debilitates prospects for popular contestation
of existing economic and political circumstances. Then, armed with a clearheaded
understanding of how patron-clientelism undermines civil society and contributes to
authoritarian resiliency, it will present means of redirecting patron-clientelism so that
meaningful political and economic change in the interests of marginalized groups can be
affected.
As a final brief methodological note, this thesis emerged from unsophisticated
beginnings. It started as a broad inquiry directed toward whomever the present author
was able to conversationally engage in bars and coffee shops around Amman, Jordan.
Introductory questions usually involved the following: ‘how do politics in Jordan serve
your interests?’ and ‘how do politics in Jordan fall short of meeting your interests?’ After
repeated interlocutors made mention of wasta, the focus of questioning in subsequent
conversations shifted toward how wasta manifest in their lives, either as a source of
empowerment or frustration.
These informal interviews were then supplemented by research of a more
scholarly nature and subjects like wasta, nepotism and, later, patron-clientelism were
explored thoroughly using sources such as Google and Google Scholar. Much of the
literature about wasta seemed to indicate that its processes, although having undeniable
links to government, were expressed most prominently in society. This brought
immediately to mind Antonio Gramsci’s civil society and led to a close reading of his
prison notes and earlier writing.
8

The accumulation of reading about wasta and civil society brought this project to
its initial form. After submitting one of the earlier drafts in the form of a Statement of
Intent for PhD candidacy to mentor Alan Gilbert, the urgency for writing from a valueconscious perspective was realized. This brought into consideration the ideas discussed in
the third chapter and shaped the pointed nature of writing found more generally in this
thesis.
The two interviews relied upon as primary sources in the fifth chapter were
friends made during the present author’s time in Jordan. Amjad Tadros, as one of the
founders of Syria Direct, was often in the Amman office and made himself entirely
accessible for conversations and interviews. Akram Al-Deek became a close personal
friend of the present author and welcomed long conversations about politics, literature
and life in Jordan. Both Amjad and Akram were invaluable in the development of what is
now this thesis. It is the present author’s hope that in addition to making a compelling
case about patron-clientelism in Jordan, both of their views will be represented
authentically.

9

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Patron-Clientelism
In order to characterize thoroughly the considerable body of literature surrounding
studies of patron-clientelism in Middle East, both diachronic and synchronic approaches
to analysis of its scholarship are helpful. Although patron-clientelism (in Arabic: wasta)
was a phenomenon mentioned in passing by academics as early as the 1960s,5 its first
substantive study in Middle East Studies was undertaken by Robert Cunningham and
Yasin Sarayrah in the early 1990s. Reflecting what became a trend in research at the
time, their focus was the adverse effect of patron-clientelism on internally generated
economic growth in countries of the Middle East. Their seminal works defined wasta as a
concept denoting the, “practice of utilizing social networks to attain goals… [and]
favoritism based on tribal and family affiliation.”6 With regard to the particular
mechanisms through which goals were attained, wasta was associated with, the act [as
well as the related actor] of mediation or intercession.7 These ideas were contextualized

5

R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers.
1993. p. 3.
6

S Ali, et al. “Social Capital in Jordan: Wasta in Employment Selection.” The International Conference on
Organization and Management (ICOM), Abu Dhabi. 2015.
7

R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers.
1993. p. 1-2.
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with reference to inter-tribal and inter-familial relations, and enunciated with examples
crossing social, political and economic dimensions. From Cunningham and Sarayrah
onward, common illustrations of patron-clientelism relate to dispute resolution,8 political
candidacy,9 betrothal,10 employee selection,11 school admittance12 and procurement of
government documents or services.13
Problematizing one directional conceptualization of patron-clientelism,
subsequent scholarship sought nuanced approaches to register its potentially positive
effects. For example, in a study of employment selection practices in Jordan authors Ali,
Raiden and Kirk use a social capital lens to identify six distinct themes associated with
patron-clientelism: (i) wasta as an enabler to get jobs, (ii) wasta as social ties/ solidarity,
(iii) wasta as a method to transfer/attain information, (iv) wasta as a guide in decisionmaking, (v) wasta as an exchange, (vi) wasta as pressure.14 Their conclusion was that
because wasta can be divided into different types and processes, and because those types

8

A Mohamed, H Hamdy. “The Stigma of Wasta: The Effect of Wasta on Perceived Competence and
Morality.” German University in Cairo, Working Paper Series. 2008.
9

M Branin, F Analoui. “Human Resource Management in Jordan.” In Managing Human Resources in the
Middle East by P Budhwar and K Mullahi. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2006.
10

R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers.
1993. p. 2.
11

M Loewe, et al. “The Impact of Favouritism on the Business Climate: A Study on Wasta in Jordan.”
German Development Institute. 2007.
12

R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers.
1993. p. 120.
13

A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing.
2008. p. 328
14

S Ali, et al. “Social Capital in Jordan: Wasta in Employment Selection.” The International Conference
on Organization and Management (ICOM), Abu Dhabi. 2015.
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and processes are unequal in moral value, sweeping suggestions about the universally
problematic nature of patron-clientelism tend to essentialize. They argue that whereas the
first two categories of wasta in Jordan have the potential to, respectively, privilege
personal connections over merit and foment exclusionary practices, its other
manifestations such as information exchange operate on a plane of moral neutrality.
While continuing to orbit the same argument, scholarship surrounding patronclientelism has also evolved by way of expansion beyond the realm of political economy.
Applying social movement theory to the study of patron-clientelism in the Middle East,
Janine Clark examines the nature and significance of networks in which Islamic social
institutions are embedded, as well as the type and behavior of participants within those
networks. Professor Clark argues that whereas social movements tend to consist of
horizontal social networks that are homogenous15 and reproducing,16 patron-client
relationships are unequal and operational through vertical structures. The simplest of
these relationships, “involve patrons who use their influence and/or resources to provide
protection and/or benefits to clients who in turn reciprocate by offering support and
assistance, potentially votes, for example.”17 Clark concludes by noting that, “although
scholars disagree on whether these relationships serve as a form of social stability
through vertical integration or as a means of entrenching the class system (in other words,

15

B Klandermans. “The Social Construction of Protests and Multiorganizational Fields.” In Frontiers in
Social Movement Theory by A Morris and C Mueller. Yale University Press. 1992.
16

D McAdam, R Paulsen. “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” American
Journal of Sociology. 1993.
17

J Clark. “Social Movement Theory and Patron Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle
Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen.” Comparative Political Studies. 2004. p. 946.
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ensuring that the poor remain poor), they agree that patron-client relations are entered
freely, with both sides perceiving, at least in the short run, mutual benefit.”18
On the far side of the discourse alluded to, Aseel Al-Ramahi provides a
genealogical perspective of wasta, frames it as a culturally bound dispute resolution
process, and argues on behalf of its benefit for Middle Eastern society. With specific
reference to the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom, Al-Ramahi outlines Abdullah bin
Husayn’s arrival to Transjordan in 1920, and the salience of tribal networking in
economic and political transactions at the time.19 Realizing the value of tribal support for
any aspirations of rulership, bin Husayn gained favor with tribes by using them to
channel resources and services originating from the central government. Through this
process mutual dependence emerged as tribes became reliant on the resources from the
central government and the legitimacy of the monarchy became contingent upon support
from tribes. The centrality of wasta in the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom, AlRamahi argues, sewed seeds enabling it to prevail as a convention in Jordan society
today. Despite increasing repudiation of wasta in the 21st century, Al-Ramahi concludes,
the Jordanian state and its society have their origins in wasta; because of this, the concept
is inextricably linked with the country’s future as much as its past.20 Far from
demonstrating specific positive moral value emanating from manifestations of patron-

18

Ibid.
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M Hammami. “Political Uncertainty, Investment Decisions and Development Policy Implications.”
Workshop Paper: Research Bank on the World Bank. 2006.
20

A Al-Ramahi. “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society.” Arab
Law Quarterly. 2008.
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clientelism in Jordan, this article seems to at best present a thorough review of its
historical basis, alongside a vague suggestion that the cultural rootedness of patronclientelism implies its future utility.
Offering a less value-suggestive historical perspective, Alan Richards and John
Waterbury provide a succinct characterization of the evolution of patron-clientelism in
the Middle East, with specific reference to its classical and contemporary images. The
classical example they outline is the landowner who, in a semi-feudal arrangement,
“Monopolizes in a given locale the most precious fixed asset, land…[and]
controls access to it. His clients are his tenants, laborers and sharecroppers. He
protects them… supplies them agricultural inputs and monetary credit, assists
them if they fall ill… The clients in turn produce for him, supply him free labor,
vote for him if elections are an issue, and fight for him if he is attacked by
outsiders.”21
In comparison,
“Today, with the growth of large bureaucratic states… the patron is more likely to
be a broker… [of] access to state resources… [or] protect[orate] against various
forms of state action. He may help procure a birth certificate… [or] help place a
son in university… [or] swing a loan through the agricultural credit bank. What
the patron receives in return is somewhat amorphous.”22
While focusing on the roles of patrons, this analysis is helpful because it highlights their
role as protectorates across time. What Richards and Waterbury omit from their
discussion is consideration of whether, though mutually beneficial, patron-client
relationships produce equal benefits for both patrons and clients.

21

A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing.
2008. p. 328.
22

A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing.
2008. p. 329.
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Having confronted the literature surrounding patron-clientelism since its
introduction into academic consciousness, final consideration requires a look at its place
in contemporary scholarship. The most recent and significant publication on the subject
comes from de Elvira et al., who develop the concept of ‘networks of dependency’ to
characterize the role of patron-clientelism in the Middle East and North Africa. They
argue that patron-client relationships are “neither static (as a simple pillar of rule of a
resilient authoritarian regime) nor do they evolve in a linear way, i.e. towards
strengthening or weakening a political regime.”23 As a research perspective, the
‘network’ directs attention to the complex, asymmetric and multifaceted character of the
social relations, while ‘dependency’ implies mutually binding reciprocity and emphasizes
the often-ignored agency of the client.24 Although from a methods approach the
application of networks theory to understand patron-client relationships is not novel, the
perspective of de Elvira et al. is important because it injects nuance into a previously
dichotomous discourse. Rather than arguing that patron-clientelism is a feature of Middle
Eastern society with inherently positive or negative effects, they suggest it can be both.
Pertaining directly to the project at hand, de Elvira et al. also include in their book
a case study of Jordan, written by Luis Melián Rodríguez, outlining the role of tribes as
contributors to the resilience of Jordan’s authoritarian system, and how dynamics of
patron-clientelism have evolved since the Arab Spring. This analysis emphasizes the

23

L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency.
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 13.
24

L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency.
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 7.
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central role played by tribal organizations within the Jordanian monarchy,25 considers
tribes to be an intermediate structure that functions as patronage brokers and describes
how this social structure is self-reinforcing, a quality that helps maintain the political
status quo.26
With regard to Jordan’s experience during the Arab Spring, protests showed that
the diminishing of the regime’s distributive capacity had seriously shaken and eroded the
entrenched foundations of its support.27 However, because protestors did not identify
tribal leaders as responsible for their impoverishment the structures of patron-clientelism
situated around tribes remained. With their influence intact, tribal leaders worked to
block privatization processes they saw interlinked with widespread corruption, warning
“should the government forge ahead with these kind of policies ‘the immunity enjoyed by
the monarch might not be extended.’”28 This enabled defensive democratization that sidestepped substantive change, bolstered authoritarian resiliency and perpetuated existing
tribal power dynamics.
Rodríguez’s chapter is important because it provides introductory analysis of how
patron-client relationships shape politics in the Hashemite Kingdom. It also helps explain
in tangible terms how patron-clientelism contributes to authoritarian resiliency. Related

25

R Brynen. “The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan.” Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Arab World, Vol. 2. Lynne Rienner Publishing. 1998. p. 71-100.
26

L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency.
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 211.
27

Ibid. p. 224.
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S Helfont, T Helfont. “Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council.” Elsevier
Limited: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2012.
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to this project more generally, this chapter is helpful because, as Rodríguez notes,
“Jordan has in many respects been neglected by both the international political arena and
scholarly analysis.”29
With consideration to both the development and evolution of literature
surrounding patron-clientelism in the Middle East, as well its position in contemporary
scholarship, one overarching theme emerges. In almost every case, studies of patronclientelism have an actor-centric focus, and usually the actor in question is the patron.
This is important for understanding how patron-client relationships function and evolve
but has less relevance for hopes to understand the effects of patron-client relationships on
spheres of political exchange, or the likelihood of political movements emerging from
below. In this vein, Rodríguez from the preceding paragraph comes closest to explaining
how patron-client power dynamics affect political conditioning, but again focus primarily
on the role of tribes, ie. the patron.
An opportunity for innovation within this subject of study is a closer examination
of the bearing of patron-client relationship dynamics on spaces of political
mobilization— i.e. civil society— and how the exclusionary practices perpetuated by
patron-client relationships contribute to a broader and more collectively experienced
debilitation of civil society. Acknowledging the cultural rootedness of wasta in the
Middle East, this analysis would not serve as a source of value judgement, or to suggests
its inherently malevolent or benevolent nature. Rather, stepping past the historic debate in

29

L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency.
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 211.
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scholarship vis-à-vis patron-clientelism this project will demonstrate that a negative
moral value can be attributed to prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan
because they tend to undermine civil society, prevent democratization and contribute to
authoritarian resiliency. In terms of its focus and method, this is a task yet to be
undertaken.

B. Civil Society & Antonio Gramsci
Antonio Gramsci is simultaneously heralded as one of the most innovative and
obscure political theorists of the 20th century. This makes understanding and attempting
to appropriately apply his concepts a complex process with considerable reward— if only
for the feeling of having completed a puzzle most scholars quickly abandon. One of the
problems associated with reading Gramsci is that his writing is at times incredibly vague,
with some of his most important concepts left only partially developed.
With reference specifically to his Prison Notebooks, the reason for this ambiguity,
or censorship in places where more lucidity might have been possible, can be attributed
to the circumstances under which Gramsci completed the bulk of his writing: a fascist
prison cell. When comparing Gramsci’s political writings with the more straightforward
letters he mailed to his wife and sons, a measure of intentionality can be presumed of his
vagueness in the former. This creates an alluring sense in readers that a sort of hidden
message is available within Gramsci’s political writings, if only one is willing to exert the
requisite effort to discover it. Conceptually, this playfulness and inaccessibility in
Gramsci’s writings align with his thoughts on education insofar as he believed it should
18

be ‘an assiduous process in which truth is fecund only when one has made an effort to
master it and reproduced in himself the state of anxiety which the scholar passed through
before arriving at it.’30
With regard to uses of Gramsci, an immense body of scholarship has applied his
concepts in order to explain political circumstances and behavior across the 20th and 21st
centuries. Among the most significant of scholars to confront Gramsci are Robert Cox,
Sara Roy, Edward Said and Stuart Hall. What tends to vary between different
applications of Gramsci, what makes reading Edward Said substantially different from
reading someone like Robert Cox, is the way in which Gramsci’s concepts and
methodologies are elucidated. Some ‘Gramscian scholars,’ such as Alastair Davidson,
like to suggest a sort of range of legitimacy in terms true adherence to Gramsci’s work
represented by those who study him. Gramsci himself recognized that no theory— even
Marx’s— could be treated as if the author were a Messiah who had laid down a nostrum
once and for all,31 so these claims tend to read as arrogant and polemical. A humbler and
more fruitful digestion of Gramscian scholarship capitalizes and draws insight from their
varied means of application— the different things different Gramsci scholars do well.
After discussing the broader ways in which Gramsci has been most prominently applied,
indicating how these applications inform the process of confronting Gramsci, a close
discussion of lesser-known scholars’ employment of Gramsci’s civil society will follow.
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Robert Cox repeatedly stated that ‘his work does not purport to be a critical study
of Gramsci’s political theory but merely a derivation from it of some ideas useful for a
revision of current international relations theory,’32 and so the benefit of his
methodological approach exists on the broadest conceptual level. What Cox attempted to
accomplish in his 1996 article was an extrapolation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony—
one of the most referenced of Gramsci’s concepts— in order explain the international
system. To do this, Cox took what Gramsci said about the Socialist political struggle
during and around the turn of the 20th century and it applied it to contemporary
circumstances. 33 This was a fruitful endeavor in the sense that it presented in accessible
terms a Gramscian notion of hegemony— as well as some of Gramsci’s other concepts.
One could also compliment Cox’s use of the history which Gramsci drew upon to
expound some of these concepts. For instance, reference to debates within the Third
International concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of a
Soviet socialist state.34 These references are important because they, on one hand,
acknowledge the domestic orientation of Gramsci’s thinking, and on the other,
extrapolate onto an international field the strategies Gramsci presented as means for
affecting hegemonic reconfiguration. In a word, Cox’s extrapolation represents a
development of Gramsci’s hegemony that grows beyond its original conceptual
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presentation. It uses Gramsci as a methodological point of departure such that concepts—
applied to contemporary circumstances— become elaborated and dynamic in the
specificity of particular historical moments.
Also important about Cox’s application is his discussion of the relationship
between Gramsci and Machiavelli. This is helpful for understanding the nuance with
which hegemonic configurations exist and also the importance of both consent and
coercion in pursuit and defense of hegemony. Gramsci’s appreciation for Machiavelli’s
Prince is presented in relatively concrete terms and centers on ways in which leaders can
conquer an existing state or cultivate a new type of state.35 Leaders in politics, Gramsci
indicates, can refer to either an individual or a more or less numerous political body, and
so the usefulness of Machiavelli can be found in the parallels between strategies
prescribed for a prince and those for a political party. Cox emphasizes this relationship in
his discussion of consent and coercion: “The Machiavellian connection frees the concept
of power (and of hegemony as one form of power) from a tie to historically specific
social classes and gives it a wider applicability to relations of dominance and
subordination, including…relations of the world order.”36 What Cox argues here is not
that Gramsci imagines diminished saliency of class conflict, or diminished relevance of
one type of power over another. Rather, he astutely describes the nuanced ways
relationships of domination and subordination can exist and the ways in which (extending
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beyond coercion) that domination can be secured. This is instructive for students
attempting to grasp and apply Gramsci because it reminds them to look beyond static
notions of hegemony particular to historical circumstance, toward the dynamic ensemble
of its constitutive relationships: what Gramsci referred to as the “interplay of relations
between principal groups of the fundamental classes and the auxiliary forces directed by,
or subjected to, their hegemonic influence.”37
Sara Roy is one of the few scholars who have branched out beyond Gramsci’s
concept of hegemony and has done so with specific regard to civil society in the Middle
East. In her chapter on the Gaza Strip from AR Norton’s book Civil Society in the Middle
East, Dr. Roy defines two forms in which civil society can be manifest: the liberal
pluralist model and the Marxist model. The liberal pluralist model is based on democracy
as the ideal form of government and capitalism as the ideal form of economic
organization. Within this framework, civil society is “independent of the state but not
necessarily opposed to it and is assigned primacy as the realm of economic relations
organized by the marketplace.”38 For her Marxist model, Dr. Roy uses Gramsci to
suggest civil society as a “weapon against capitalism, not an accommodation to it,”39 the
sphere of the exploited where the struggle against state domination must be waged.40
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Roy’s insight is important because it draws attention to Gramsci’s strategies for
“industrially and socially advanced states… where civil society has become a complex
structure resistant to catastrophic incursions.”41 In advanced states, a dialectical
relationship exists between political society (ie. the bureaucratic, coercive state
apparatus) and civil society, wherein the ideologies and interests held by participants in
the state apparatus are intertwined with and reflected by civil society. In this
circumstance, the state (political society) is described by Gramsci as only an “an outer
ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks.”42 All of
this is to say that in advanced states, direct confrontation with the state apparatus— what
Gramsci calls a war of maneuver— is difficult, because civil society forms its reinforcing
and protective element. What Roy alludes to is that in advanced states contests for
hegemony must occur first in civil society (war of position), as in a war of ideas through
the manufacturing of consent. Civil society must be toppled in the sense that the
prevalent ideologies and interests within it— reflective of those attributable to political
society— are undermined, making way for hegemonic reconfiguration and the eventual
transition of control over political society.
What one should be cautious of while reading Dr. Roy is that her take on civil
society could be misconstrued to suggest an inherently oppositional element (in conflict
with political society) operative in an inevitable or binary contest of hegemony. This is
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not something Dr. Roy suggests specifically, but it is something that could be inferred
without background familiarity with Gramsci. On the first, although civil society can be a
‘weapon against capitalism,’ as mentioned in the previous paragraph it can also function
as a reinforcement mechanism for existing hegemonic social and economic structures
reflective and supportive of political society- which could be capitalist. On the second, an
important note about processes of hegemonic reconfiguration is that Gramsci never used
the term “counter-hegemony,”43 though his strategies pointed toward obvious
revolutionary objectives.
Instead of drawing from Dr. Roy to conceptualize civil society as a battlefield in
which two dichotomous entities clash until one submits to the other, a better metaphor
would describe it as a playing field where numerous teams compete. Rather than a twoparty war (which can exist but only superficially characterizes competition), a
renegotiation of the complex relationships of hegemony occurs. This idea can be linked
to Cox’s discussion of Machiavelli and reinforces Gramsci’s notion of civil society being
an,
“Ensemble of organisms… wherein the functions of hegemony comprise
spontaneous consent given by the great masses to the general direction imposed
on social life by the dominant group and the apparatus of state coercive power
which legally enforces discipline on groups who do not consent.”44
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Although Dr. Roy does not develop her interpretation of Gramsci’s civil society further
than a few pages, her portrayal of him offers an introduction that extends beyond
simplistic presentations of his platitudinal ‘hegemony’ or ‘war of position’ concepts.
Edward Said provides a philological approach to Gramscian concepts, which—
from a methodological perspective— is instructive for novice readers of Gramsci. His
perspective is one aided by knowledge of the Italian language and exposure to Gramsci’s
earlier work in Ordine Nuovo.45 As a scholar of comparative literature with keen
appreciation for linguistics, Edward Said’s primary interest with regard to Gramsci was
the meaning of discourse and how intellectual work could be elaborated into a mass
belief. In other words, how ideas become active and how actions reflect ideas.
This provides the conceptual undertones for Said’s concern about the reasons for
defeat of ‘subaltern’ voices of the ‘Orient’ by orientalism.46 Using Gramsci’s hegemony
as a point of departure, Said characterizes how a complex of educational practices and
institutions— whose object was to create mass consent to a particular world view—
resulted in cultural hegemony and gave orientalism durability.47 What is most fascinating
about Said’s research and use of Gramsci is that it related directly to his lived experience
and personal ambition to raise up the marginalized voices of persons from the Middle
East. In other words, he applied Gramsci’s concepts not as a general theory but as a
practical guide for action.
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The instructive value in Said is that he duplicates Gramsci’s methodological
approach. Said takes it to heart when Gramsci says,
“The starting-point of critical elaboration is the new consciousness of what one
really is and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process today,
which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory…
and therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.”48
In parallel, Said’s Orientalism is, “an attempt to inventory the traces upon [himself], the
Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life
of all Orientals.”49 This is important for novice readers because it guides them toward
appreciation for the ways in which Gramsci employed his concepts, prompting them to
step beyond superficial appreciation for them in abstract.
Stuart Hall, also important because of his methodological approach, offers several
innovations. In the first case, having thoroughly digested the body of Gramsci’s work,
Hall categorizes Gramsci’s concepts on the basis of how much attention and development
they received. So, for example Hall gives, ‘pride of place to civil society [and] relegates
the concept of hegemony because hegemony is a notion not well developed.’50 Although
Hall was not pretentious enough to suggest his methodological approach was superior to
others’, this creates an interesting point of comparison to works that seem to
operationalize concepts on the basis of relevance rather than Gramsci’s own emphasis.
This could be a point to make about Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist
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Strategy Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, although it is generally agreed that the
hegemony they elaborate is a far departure from Gramsci’s.
Another intriguing component of Stuart Hall’s work is that it adheres closely to
Gramsci’s emphasis on the historicity of his concepts: the notion that his concepts are
meaningless in the abstract and can only be fully developed when elaborated through
historical circumstance and with regard to specific conjunctures. As an example of this
exercise, it is worth examining briefly Stuart Hall’s work on Thatcherism from the late
1980s. Hall begins his article with the suggestion that the conditions in Britain were,
“Strikingly similar to those Italy when fascism had defeated the workers
movement in a struggle for ideological dominance… [and] that the conjuncture
for this struggle for a new ‘common sense’ was the ‘organic crisis’ of the British
economy and society owing to the oil crisis, massive debt and consequent
inability to pay for the welfare state.”51
What results from analysis of Hall’s work is a best usages guide for the practical
application of Gramsci: a guide’s guide. It is because of Hall’s emphasis on the centrality
of civil society in Gramsci’s work that from here out, civil society will receive the bulk of
attention.
One recent scholar to write about civil society in the Middle East used Gramscian
frameworks to present an insightful empirical argument. J Leigh Doyle describes in her
article how western conceptualizations of civil society have shaped the way civil society
is imagined existing in the Middle East, contributing to the problematic belief that
democratization is possible if only western countries support civil society organizations
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in the Middle East. Using Turkey as a case study, she argues that contrary to the
dominant view which equates civil society with democracy, civil society organizations in
the Middle East often assist elites, extending and consolidating their political and
economic power.52
Similar to the categorizations introduced by Dr. Roy, Doyle articulates a liberal
conception of civil society by referencing Alexis de Tocqueville who argued that
associations provided ordinary citizens with the power to prevent ‘either tyranny of
parties or the whims of princes.’53 But instead of framing civil society from a Gramscian
perspective in solely oppositional terms, Doyle’s is more nuanced. Here, Doyle
references Joseph Buttigieg who suggests that,
“Political society and the bureaucratic structures of the state can, and do intervene
in civil society and, far from being necessarily opposed to the state (as with the
liberal-democratic understanding) civil society is embodied with class relations
and is thus very often its most resilient element; it is [the] arena wherein the
ruling class extends and reinforces its power by nonviolent means.”54
Doyle’s approach to Gramsci, in this sense, is important because it demonstrates how
civil society can perpetuate authoritarian resiliency— despite what Western policymakers
with liberal conceptions of civil society might think. This perspective does not supersede
optimistic notions of civil society as a playing field in which ideologies compete and
hegemony can be challenged. Rather, it presents an important reminder to readers that
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Gramsci did not see civil society as only a weapon for the subaltern, he saw it as being
accessible by a swath of competitors: including the subaltern but also the existing
hegemon.
Joseph Buttigieg, responsible for the most recent translations of Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks— and also father to Presidential Candidate Pete Buttigieg— offers a theory
oriented and incredibly thorough discussion of Gramsci’s civil society in his 1995 article.
In it, Buttigieg provides important insight for how Gramsci’s civil society should be
applied, understood, and interconnected with his other concepts. For example, the
suggestion that drawing excerpts from isolated and particular passages on civil society
without contextualizing them in Gramsci’s other and extensive discussions on the topic is
fraught with problems.55 He also contributes nuance to earlier mentioned discussions on
the topic and argues that Gramsci’s civil society is dynamic and not one directional.
Perhaps most importantly, with reference to Gramsci’s Southern Question, Buttigieg
emphasizes that,
“While appearing to favor the seemingly common interests of industrial capital
and the industrial labor force, the government protectionist policies were, in
reality perpetuating the misery and exploitation of an enormous segment of the
population in the South, who remained trapped in a quasi-feudal socioeconomic
system.”56
This last point is especially important because it draws attention to processes within civil
society that can be co-opted by the state in order to present the guise of protection for
members of subaltern classes, while in fact consolidating their own authoritarian rule.
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While the publications surrounding Gramsci are vast and entail varying
methodological approaches, those mentioned here provide a starting point and guide.
What remains absent in scholarly literature is the application of Antonio Gramsci’s
methodological strategies to describe civil society in Jordan. More precisely, the
application of Gramscian concepts and methodologies as a means of identifying and
registering institutions within Jordanian civil society responsible for perpetuating
authoritarian resiliency, so that they can be undermined. This requires acknowledgement
of the historical similarities between the experiences about which Antonio Gramsci
wrote, and the social, economic, and political circumstances of Jordan today, as well as
an account of the interrelatedness of Gramsci’s other concepts. This is a task that will
require reference to Gramsci directly, but for the purpose of a literature review it was
important to describe the ways in which Gramsci has been used.
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CHAPTER THREE: VALUE-CENTERED ANALYSIS AND DEMOCRATIC
INDIVIDUALITY

As was indicated with reference to trends in scholarship surrounding patronclientelism in the Middle East, studies in contemporary political economy sometimes
center on value-free analysis. Neutrality is pursued in the sense that rather than
challenging institutions like patron-clientelism, attempts have been made to demonstrate
their dynamism, ie. tendency to function along non-linear, both morally positive and
problematic axes. This trend is particularly true for LR de Elvira, et al.’s Clientelism and
Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. Their efforts,
as illustrated with the concept of networks of dependency, suggest that patron-clientelism
has the potential to serve a mutual benefit for both patrons and clients. Rightly, it
indicates how— at least in a marginal sense— the client is as important in serving the
needs of the patron as the patron is in serving the needs of the client. This analysis falls
short, however, of registering the advantages of patron-client relationships in comparative
terms. In other words, LR de Elvira et al. do not categorize or emphasize ways in which
patron-clientelism operates as a self-reinforcing mechanism that, on one hand, serves the
immediate short-term needs of a client, while on the other, solidifying the long-term
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position and influence of the patron, ie. the systemic consequences that are not morally
neutral.
The problem with this kind of analysis is that it falls short of identifying particular
ways and circumstances in which patron-clientelism can be damaging, in terms of
broader prospects for social mobility and political development. It poses itself as
apolitical by instead reflecting upon the various ways in which patron-clientelism
manifests, without challenging the effect of those manifestations. One can speculate
about the reasons for this type of analysis, and in terms of academic rigor it makes sense
that literature would avoid sweeping condemnations of historically and culturally
engrained institutions. It would also be distinctly orientalist for Western scholars to
comment on these institutions with the suggestion: if only you broke ways with these
backwards traditions, your prospects for economic and political development would
improve— you could be like us.57 But something different is taking place in this analysis.
Reference to important thinkers like Said, Gramsci and Marx will show that literature
about politics is in its nature political, and thus carries with it an either explicit or implicit
value judgement with regard to historical circumstances and behavior. It is therefore
possible to identify, from a perspective of moral objectivity, historical circumstances and
behavior that are problematic, and demonstrate concretely the ways in which they are so.
With specific regard to patron-clientelism in Jordan, that is the task of this thesis.
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The reason for this discussion here is that it categorizes the current project in
relation to existing literature. It presents the simple argument that in a particular
circumstance patron-clientelism functions in particular ways that foment barriers to entry
into the political process, preventing broader opportunities for political development. The
results of these manifestations of patron-clientelism are authoritarian resiliency, ie.
solidification of existing socio-political structures and perpetuation of subalternity for
non-elite classes. In other words, this project— in contrast to contemporary scholarship—
presents a claim related to the morally objective value of patron-clientelism in Jordan.
Using models from Said, Marx and Gramsci, a negative moral value will be attributed to
prominent forms of patron-clientelism. This, of course, is something very different than
suggesting patron-clientelism has universal morally negative implications. Such a claim
would be essentialist and equally problematic alongside benign representations of patronclientelist dynamism. Instead, this discussion is intended to present a kind of selfawareness in terms of the scope of its analysis and effect, while also offering unequivocal
moral determination.
Taking a step backwards, the presupposed argument here is that literature about
politics is inherently political. This is a claim attributable to both Antonio Gramsci and
Edward Said. For Said, Western scholarship about the Orient demonstrates how political
scholarship is incapable of presenting ‘pure,’ (apolitical) knowledge and reflects a power
contest that exists on an uneven field of political domination. Further elaboration is
helpful.
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In the simplest terms, Said defines orientalism as “a way of coming to terms with
the Orient based on the Orient’s special place in European Western Experience.”58
Although by ‘Orient’ Said refers primarily to Arabs and Islam (what can be referred to
loosely as ‘Middle Eastern and Muslim cultures’), the concept is not limited to geospatial
or religious typology. Encompassing both, it refers more importantly to the relationship
between, on one hand, Arabs and Islam, and on the other, the West, represented by
literature. In other words, Said’s orientalism is a relational means to understand the
distinction between Orient and Occident, the distribution of geopolitical awareness into
texts and interests related to control, manipulation and incorporation reflected by texts.59
At a broader conceptual level, it is analysis of discourse that is produced and exists in an
uneven exchange between various kinds of power.
Said describes a dialectical relationship between Orientalists— that is, scholars
writing about the Orient— and the orientalist body of work they contribute to. In parallel,
a dialectic also exists between the ensemble of relationships that compose global political
hegemonic power and literature or discourse that surrounds those arrangements of power.
In other words, when an author produces literature about the Arab and Muslim world, he
is either consciously or subconsciously affected by literature that came before his own
and either consciously or subconsciously complicit in forwarding the objectives of what
came before him. Said defines this as ‘strategic location:’ the way of describing an
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author’s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about.60 This
leads to operation within self-perpetuating frameworks, in which the relationships
between groups of texts (Said’s ‘strategic formation’) acquire referential power and
thereafter gain influence in culture at large.61
The result of this series of relationships is the production of what Said calls
‘political knowledge.’ What he means by this is that the knowledge reflected in literature,
in his case about the Orient, is both a representation and extension of real-world power.
This is not to suggest that political knowledge is inherently bad; Said admits that his own
intellectual endeavors have political value. Rather, Said argues that intellectuals should
stop trying to fool themselves by believing their work is ‘pure,’ uninfluenced by
arrangements of hegemonic power. What is most important is the type of metaconsciousness and self-awareness referred to earlier. All work is bound to have some
implication for power and be influenced by power— that is the dialectical relationship
between author and literature/literature and real-world power. Only by acknowledging
that component of academic life can academic endeavors be legitimized.
The absence of this academic self-awareness— what in platitudinal academic
discourse is called positionality— is twofold. In the first case it leads to the production of
exteriority representation. “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact
that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders
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its mysteries plain for and to the West.”62 What Said is describing is the manufacturing of
an image, by the West and for the West, of something different from the West so that it
can be digestible in the West. It is the process of putting the Orient into terms accessible
for a Western audience, a process which has the effect of producing something altogether
different from the Orient itself. In contrast to ‘natural depictions’ of the Orient, these
representations respond more to agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects and
the culture that produced them than their putative object.63 This presents a tangible way
to think about how and why orientalism is manifest. It is manifest in ways that reaffirm
its audience’s sophistication and cultural hegemony. It manifests this way because it
assumes of those ‘lesser Orientals’ that they are incapable of representing themselves,
and therefore the task must be undertaken by those with greater sophistication, ie. the
West. This offers an apt example of how scholarship is not only political in that it
reinforces and aggrandizes its own cultural hegemony, but also of how value judgements
are implicit within it.
The second result of scholarship without awareness, the logical next step of what
was described in the preceding paragraph, is that it becomes increasingly detached from
reality. Scholars operating under the assumption that what they produce is ‘pure’ or
apolitical knowledge ignore the series of relationships described above and the ways in
which those relationships shape scholarship. “The general liberal consensus that ‘true
knowledge’ is fundamentally non-political (and conversely that overtly political

62

E Said. Orientalism. Random House Inc. 1978. p. 21.

63

Ibid. p. 22.

36

knowledge is not true) obscures the highly organized political circumstances obtaining
when knowledge is produced.”64 One could extrapolate from Said a warning about the
risk faced by scholars oblivious to ways real-life power dynamics shape their work. If a
scholar is unaware of his position within a scholarly corpus, or of the ways in which that
body affect his work, then he is unable to control for that influence. Unwittingly, he
continues contributing to the body— as that body continues influencing him— while the
body and scholar together are unhampered in devolution toward greater absorption with
representational frameworks suited for the needs of their audience. This is a process of
increasing detachment from reality because it is a process absent of actors standing in the
way of detachment from reality. At a point,
“Knowledge no longer requires application to reality: knowledge is what gets
passed on silently, without comment, from one text to another… Ideas are
propagated, disseminated anonymously, repeated without attribution; they have
literally become idées recue… what matters is that they are there to be echoed and
re-echoed uncritically.”65
This is perhaps the worst type of scholarship: that which is political but unaware; that
which contributes to a particular end but does not realize; that which becomes so selfabsorbed and uncritical that its only bearing on reality is the unintentional reinforcement
of existing structures of political domination.
Related to the question at the outset about the inherent political quality of
scholarship surrounding politics, Said is both insightful and instructive. His registry helps
categorize the ways in which relationships that constitute real-world power shape
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discourse, how actions and ideas reflect one another. He helps characterize what happens
when scholars are unaware of their situation within existing structures of cultural
hegemony and become unwitting mechanisms of reinforcement. And, he explains how
this process in total foments an uncritical approach to reality- eventuating detachment
from reality. This is precisely what the project at hand seeks to avoid. With regard to
Elvira et al., one could make the criticism that they present an uncritical view of reality,
one that does not challenge existing manifestations of patron-clientelism. Thus, their
work provides a neutral register of ways in which patron-clientelism exists without
emphasizing why those manifestations are harmful or reasons why they should be altered.
This project, in contrast, seeks to present its case in such a way mindful of the influences
of Western hegemony and to step beyond the unexamined assumption that institutions in
Jordan are as they will be. By demonstrating how particular manifestations of patronclientelism are harmful it will show both why and how changes in the institutions and
relationships that represent existing global political dominance are essential.
Antonio Gramsci’s perspective related to the political nature of scholarship has a
critical underlying theme equal to that of Said’s— in fact, Gramsci’s model provided
impetus for Said’s work. Although the literature he produced is sometimes understood
only as a guide for socialist strategy, a closer read reflects something more nuanced. His
approach, one could argue, is a register of risks and opportunities related to particular
historical circumstances. Risks were important for Gramsci to discuss because they
helped explain why the communist party in Italy was unsuccessful in thwarting the rise of
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Mussolini fascism. Opportunities were valuable for discussion because they presented
strategies for what the communist party in Italy could have done differently.
Underlying these operational components of Gramsci’s theory, however, is a
forceful critique of the liberal/capitalist state and its claims of universality, exposing
mechanisms and modulations of power within it.66 In short, Gramsci’s perspective is
eternally critical; the risks and opportunities he describes with reference to particular
historical circumstances are constantly interrelated with the object of challenging and
changing the status quo. The reason for his critical approach to reality is worth unpacking
and will help explain why he saw scholarship— education, more fundamentally— as
political, with essential import to the revolutionary reorganization of existing
relationships and structures constitutive of hegemony.
Two concepts Gramsci discusses at length, both which help readers understand
processes whereby the plane of civil society can be exploited to wrest cultural
dominance: intellectuals and education. Intellectuals, for Gramsci, constitute a
demographic expanded beyond common conception; they are represented not only by
what one thinks of as a ‘traditional’ academic— ie. professional intellectual— but also
include the thinking and organizing members ‘organic’ to each class. In this sense, ‘all
men are intellectuals,’ but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society.67
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The key distinction for Gramsci between intellectual and non-intellectual is a
simple fact of the direction in which their specific professional activity is directed, toward
intellectual elaboration or simple muscular-nervous effort.68 In simpler terms, Gramsci
seems to distinguish between intellectuals and non-intellectuals on the basis of ideational
intentionality attached to physical acts, pointing toward particular political end. One who
functions as an intellectual in society contributes to the critical elaboration of intellectual
activity, modifying its relationship with the muscular-nervous effort69 towards a new
equilibrium, ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself, in so far as it is an element
of a general practical activity, which is perpetually innovating the physical and social
world, becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world.70
In other words, and in close correspondence with the earlier discussion about
Said, an intellectual serves the function of aligning actions with ideas framed upon a
critical approach to the status quo. He is the driver of innovation, the ‘mover and shaker’
who directs whatever professional activity is his specialty toward the organization and
cultivation of a particular hegemonic arrangement. Solidarity or momentum gained by
any particular intellectual current— which elaborates a particular critical worldview—
reflects the zero-sum competition of civil society and the prospect of hegemonic
reconfiguration.
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While the traditional intellectual also serves the role of elaborating a worldview
so that actions are brought into alignment with the ideas and interests of a particular class,
he is not organic to a particular class. “Traditional intellectuals experience through an
‘esprit de corps’ their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification
and thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social
group.”71 Therefore, “one of the most important characteristics of any group that is
developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’
the traditional intellectuals.”72
The reasons for assimilating or co-opting traditional intellectuals might seem
obvious, but are not exclusively related to the threat they would pose as a subversive
element. By drawing them into the camp, so to speak, intellectuals can be employed as
the deputies of the dominant group— or whichever group hopes to be dominant. As such,
they exercise the functions of social hegemony and political government which comprise
the spontaneous consent given by the masses of the population to a general direction
imposed on social life, and the apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces
discipline on groups who do not consent.73
The assimilation of traditional intellectuals is vital for dominant social groups and
challenger groups on two planes: 1) the process of elaborating a worldview that then is
disseminated as an organizing element in civil society for the purpose of ‘manufacturing
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consent’ is one which can either support or contradict existing hegemonic ordering. It
would be impossible for a challenger group to alter significantly the existing hegemonic
order while ideologies and interests reflective of the dominant group were upheld and
consented to by the masses. 2) In the case of a challenger group, a war of ideas could be
won in civil society so that the consent of the masses reflects a new critical worldview
subversive to the existing hegemonic order. But, even if that is the case deputies are
needed to serve the bureaucratic functions of the state when a transition in responsibility
for governance— ie. control over political society— occurs. Rather than training a new
cadre, it is better to co-opt the old.
So, the value of intellectuals, both organic and traditional, is practical. Their work
serves to either solidify ideological support for the dominant fundamental group as well
as to carry out bureaucratic functions in political society over which it presides, or to
elaborate a critical worldview in the process of organizing opposition to the existing
hegemonic order. With regard to both functions, one could extrapolate that intellectuals’
agency—ie. their role in support or opposition to the existing hegemonic order— extends
to and is reflected by the scholarship that they publish.
Gramsci believed that science (encompassing scientific literature produced by
traditional intellectuals) was an inherently political activity because it, “transforms men
and makes them different from what they were before… it enlarges their concepts of life,
raises to a higher level life itself.”74 This point is as true for assimilated intellectuals (by
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the fundamental dominant group) as oppositional intellectuals because even a ruling class
aims to “raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level
which corresponds to the needs of productive forces for development.”75 It would appear,
therefore, in alignment with the earlier discussion about Said, that the production of
scholarship is necessarily a political activity pointed toward one of the two ends
attributed here to intellectuals.76 If Gramsci is correct, one cannot view scholarship as
simply a benign representation of life. Rather, it implicitly or explicitly has something to
say about life, either reinforcing and enhancing the existing structure of relationships and
institutions that compose the hegemonic order or challenging them.
Education relates to the role of intellectuals in two ways. First, in a purely
mechanistic sense wherein, “the more extensive the area covered by education… the
more complex the cultural world, the civilization, of a particular state.”77 This has more
to do with the development of an ethical state— one which seeks to elevate its population
in correspondence to needs related to development and production— by assimilated
intellectuals than activities directed toward hegemonic reordering carried out by
subversive intellectuals.
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A ruling class would hope to empower its intellectuals in the development of a
robust education system, one which produced subsequent intellectuals to carry out
increasingly diverse and sophisticated functions of the state. But this can also mean that a
ruling class— one responsible for articulating the ‘areas covered by education’— could
prevent the emergence of subversive currents from within the ranks of its educational
apparatus. This was true for Italy’s universities described by Gramsci:
“The universities, and all the institutions which develop intellectual and technical
abilities, since they were not permeated by the life of the parties, by the living
realities of national life, produced apolitical national cadres, with a purely
rhetorical and non-national mental formation.”78
In this sense, assimilated intellectuals through their educative functions specify the scope
of education provided to students in order to serve and protect the needs of the ruling
class. This can mean simultaneously the development of productive functions within the
state and suppression of ideas counterintuitive to the state. Education, in this framework,
represents a tool in the same way the function of intellectuals is a tool in either service or
opposition to the existing hegemonic order.
The second way in which education relates to the role of intellectuals has more to
do with the process of re-education, a foundational consideration in development of
oppositional strategies. It is essential to realize, here, that disillusionment with existing
structures reflective of hegemonic order and willingness to use force to upend them is not
enough to affect revolutionary change in industrially advanced, modern states.
Intellectuals, especially those organic to particular social groups, play a role not only in
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organizing support for ideologies oppositional to the state but also in educating the
masses so as to cultivate an alternative form of consent— that is, consent to alternative
ideologies oppositional to those of the ruling class.
This is an important point because for Gramsci, revolutionary activity had little or
nothing to do with inciting people to rebel; instead it consisted in a painstaking process of
disseminating and instilling an alternative ‘forma mentis’ by means of cultural
preparation— intellectual development and education— on a mass scale, critical and
theoretical elaboration and thoroughgoing organization.79 Organic intellectuals are
essential in this process because, in the first case, they reflect the feelings and lived
experiences particular to their class, attach ideas to those feelings and organize action. In
the second case, because of the “higher level of social elaboration, characterized by a
certain directive and technical capacity… not only in the limited sphere of his own
activity but in other spheres as well,”80 the organic intellectual is suited to expand
interests beyond corporate or class spheres and be an organizer of ‘masses of men.’81
Without the organic intellectual, cultivation of oppositional ideologies and interests in
order for consent to be manufactured at a degree of critical mass eventuating
revolutionary change is impossible. Their role in the extension of class or corporate
interests beyond those spheres reflects the re-education process, without which challenge
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to existing hegemonic ordering— direct confrontation of the state apparatus by force— is
futile.
Gramsci’s thinking about the role of intellectuals and education is interrelated—
one could even say dialectical. But the argument to be drawn from these concepts and
applied to the overarching discussion about political scholarship is a simple one.82 No
intellectual effort is benign. Either an intellectual has been assimilated within the
relationships and structures reflective of hegemonic ordering in a particular historical
circumstance, or he is operating in opposition to them.
The work intellectuals produce thus reflects a process of education that either
serve the interests of the status quo or stand in opposition to it. Scholarship offers just one
example of the ensemble of conduits through which educational processes can take place,
but one should be left with the understanding that it is never neutral. If taken seriously,
the positions of Gramsci and Said should compel intellectuals (of all sorts) to consider the
effect of their work. With regard to commentary on patron-clientelism, what hegemonic
structures do scholars contribute to or oppose by emphasizing its dynamism rather than
its dangerous ramifications? What value statements about the status quo do they express
or stand alongside, either wittingly or unwittingly? Here is the point at which a moral
barometer becomes necessary, at which a concluding discussion of moral objectivity
becomes relevant.
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There are competing models one can use to characterize historical circumstances
and behavior in ‘morally objective’ terms. Alan Gilbert in Democratic Individuality
categorizes several in order to expound a Marxian ethical model. For example, Adam
Smith’s idea of moral progress centered on a capitalist economic structure in which, a
“chain connection existed between accumulation and workers wellbeing.”83 One can
extrapolate from his perspective a positive value— in terms of moral objectivity—
attributed to circumstances and behavior that advance capitalist accumulation. But this
framework implies the existence— and perpetuated existence— of two classes with
distinct life chances, reducing personality to appropriate class activities.84 In other words,
notions of moral objectivity drawn from Adam Smith presuppose inequity and anticipate
its amelioration only as an indirect result of the fulfillment of its foremost objective:
accumulation.
Applied to the subject at hand, one could argue that because patron-clientelism
facilitates employment, enrollment in schools, development of social capital via intertribal or inter-familial relations, its productive function serves the same end important for
capitalists. In this register, the possibilities of patron-client structures excluding those
without resources from entering them or acting as barriers for participation in political
spheres— upholding elites, sustaining the subalternity of non-elites— are
inconsequential. Patron-clientelism could still be registered in morally positive terms, so
long as it serves a productive and accumulative end. Because this notion of ‘moral
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objectivity’ validates— or at the very least, registers as negligible— prospects of
marginalization and political injustice, it is an inadequate ethical model.
Marx’s nonrelativist, nonhistoricist model of ‘moral objectivity’ is nuanced in the
sense that it synthesizes instrumental and intrinsic goods, utilitarianism and individual
rights. For him, a dialectical relationship between behavior and historical circumstances
reflective of instrumental and intrinsic goods explains his “utilitarian extenuation of
capitalism, his indictment of its exploitiveness, his concepts of social individuality and
distribution according to need.”85 Instrumental goods are those that contribute to the
limited present, such that broader ultimate individual self-realization occurs at the
expense of the contemporary producing class.86 The effect of an instrumental good is one
which contributes to the elaboration of a higher good than that achieved by the limited act
or process itself. Capitalism can be registered in terms of an instrumental good because as
it advances through phases of development, proletariat exploitation and revolutionary
fervor intensifies; the former instigates the latter, the latter reflects the fact of the former.
An intrinsic good, on the other hand, is a good for its own sake, eg. struggle by the
oppressed to emancipate themselves. Progress reflective of neither intrinsic nor
instrumental good is called by Marx ‘alienated progress.’
Marx’s position can be registered in terms of a response to the utilitarian, for
whom salience is attributed to the fact that human nature is modified through historical
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achievements, ie. different phases of economic development.87 Bentham, for example,
provides a relativist approach in which value judgements about behavior take into
primary account the influence of historical circumstance. But Marx attributes an equal
and interrelated weight to human creativity and intelligence, meaning man is capable to
understand his historical circumstance, himself within it, and able to reshape both.88 It is
not the case that man’s behavior is solely a result of whatever historical circumstance he
finds himself within, nor that circumstance necessarily follows as the result of human
behavior. Instead, mutual and interrelated influence affects both processes— that is,
processes of human action and history’s movement forward.
If one were to compare the two models just introduced, one could say that
utilitarianism tends to work in an opposite direction than Marxian ethicism. A utilitarian
would argue that man’s pursuit of his own interests, the act of him accumulating personal
wealth, has the eventual effect of raising the level of economic existence for his
community. Selfishness and zero-sum competition are extenuated because their result
is— in a vague sense— a collective advantage. But in this ethical framework, no
mechanism is incorporated capable of elevating members of subaltern classes who,
without prospects for accumulating their own wealth, are written off as being unlikely to
affect the overall wellbeing of their community. Social individuality, how they and their
productive potential are viewed, is delimited to their class. Only through sufficient
enough accumulation would societal level, class transcendental change occur so that the
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individuality of subalterns could be realized. Worse, this ‘sufficient enough
accumulation’ is not an end intentionally pursued by productive classes in order to
elevate the existence of their community; rather, it is the eventual surplus the productive
class would be incapable of consuming so that bestowing it upon the subalterns is the
only alternative to wasting it.
From the opposite direction, Marxian ethicism begins with incorporation of
egalitarian recognition, at least in broad political terms, for the lives of individuals.89 It
centers on acknowledgement of the intelligence and productive potential of individuals,
while realization of their personal interests occurs simultaneously, or in reflection of the
realization, of the interests of their broader community. In this context, it is not the case
that individual endeavors to accumulate wealth represent instrumental goods in the sense
that they might later elevate the prospects for a communal or historical existence
reflective of an intrinsic good. Rather, individual productive endeavors reflect an intrinsic
good insofar as they serve the interests of the community because community and
individual interests are one and the same.
The model that Marx uses to exemplify this notion is that of the Paris commune,
in which “reforms occurred simultaneously alongside longer-term political mindedness,
manifest in assertions of democratic internationalism… an elevated sense of self-worth
and purpose and an overall political environment framed upon cooperation.”90 In other
words, democratic individuality relies upon an individual’s outward notion of his
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interests alongside those of his community and the ability to align both interests
unencumbered by the constraints of capitalism. Instrumental goods, then, are only those
that advance the possibility of such an alignment— an alignment representative of an
intrinsic good. Other instances of productivity, for example those mentioned earlier with
reference to ways in which utilitarian models would register effects of patron-clientelism
in positive value terms, represent alienated activity.
The essential import of this discussion is that it determines standards by which the
nature and effect of particular behavior can be measured, and equally, how particular
historical circumstances reflective of particular behavior can be measured. With regard to
patron-clientelism, one could argue that by standards of utilitarianism its effect of
accessing employment, education and social-capital serves a productive end— an
instrumental good in the sense that its productive outcome could at some later point serve
communal interests. But productive, precisely, for whom? It would make little difference
to a utilitarian if the access granted by patron-client relationships served exclusive social
groups, so long as productive and accumulative processes continued. The problem with
this perspective is that it diminishes the severity in risk of productivity by an elite class
determined to uphold their elite status and sustain the subalternity of non-elites. If it is
true that patron-client relationships serve a productive end, but the community at large is
excluded from benefits characteristic of that end, a greater good is not being served. It is
also not the case that the individual advantages accessed via patron-client relations are
necessarily reflective of a later potential or intention to champion community wellbeing.
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The stronger ethical model, Marx’s, acknowledges the limited effect of benefits
accessed through patron-client relationships, as well as the fact that entrance into those
relationships rarely occurs with intentionality toward communal wellbeing. This is
important not only to characterize the ethical shortcomings of patron-clientelism as it is
currently understood, but also to indicate its alternative potential— its potential from an
alternative frame of mind. Marx’s perspective is therefore essential for extending the
critical postures represented by both Said and Gramsci.
In other words, yes, it is true that scholarship is political and yes, it is also true
that there are competing ethical models one can hold against historical circumstances or
behavior to express judgement. The question becomes: which model is most compelling
to understand and characterize facts of the status quo thoroughly and work toward its
betterment. Utilitarianism falls short of appreciating nuances of individuality, and by
extrapolation, nuanced individual instances of patron-clientelism; it therefore offers no
serious impetus for challenging the problematic manifestations of patron-clientelism.
Marxian ‘moral objectivity,’ mindful that particular manifestations of patron-clientelism
serve neither instrumental nor intrinsic goods, provides foundation for a critical approach
to analysis of its prevalence in Jordan. This serves the ultimate end of this thesis which is
to rethink and redirect patron-clientelism so that ‘conditions can be created for a
consensual society wherein no individual or group is reduced to subaltern status.’91
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The value of a thorough discussion of civil society, one that precedes dissection of
the tangible manifestations and effects of patron-clientelism in Jordan, is to make the
following argument: a) patron-clientelism is one institution amongst an ensemble of
institutions, relations and associations that comprise ‘civil society’ in Jordan. b) The
institutions, associations and relations that comprise civil society in Jordan are considered
as such— that is, are considered component parts of civil society— because of their
political agency. c) Political agency reflected by processes within civil society do more to
characterize civil society than the fact of these processes occurring in a ‘private sphere’, a
space distinct from political society.92 d) Because civil society is characterized more on
the basis of the activity that takes place within it than where that activity takes place, its
component institutions, associations and relations simultaneously reflect and define it. If
these points are true, patron-clientelism can be used to understand civil society in Jordan,
its nature, the ways in which it intertwines private and public spheres and the direction of
political agency that predominates within it.
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On a deeper level, activities and processes attributable to civil society reflect not
only the fact of civil society, but also the political dominance held by a fundamental
social group and its auxiliary groups, ie. the monarchy, the political elite, etc. So, patronclientelism is an institution that reflects simultaneously the fact and character of civil
society in Jordan, as well as the overall nature of political dominance. This is the
overarching theme of this section. For purposes of elaboration, Antonio Gramsci’s model
of civil society will be relied upon as a guide.
It would be difficult to present comprehensive analysis of the ideas developed by
Antonio Gramsci, but for the purposes of this chapter there are three themes worth
discussion. These themes will be used to support the argument from the previous
paragraph and clarify how it is possible for one institution— ie. patron-clientelism— to
reflect and define civil society in Jordan, as well as indicate the direction of political
agency within it, parallel to overall arrangements of political dominance. These three key
themes are: a) dynamism and complexity, b) necessity of unification/universalization and
c) cultivation of critical culture. Not only do these themes help explain political agency
within civil society, but they also will contribute to the argument in the subsequent
chapter detailing how existing institutions can be redirected for the purposes of
reconfiguring political dominance.
One could say about Antonio Gramsci that a fundamental innovation of his
contribution to political theory is the fact of its complexity. This begins with his
characterization of the state as something more than a monolithic, bureaucratic and
coercive entity— ie., the state as a monopoly of legitimate violence. Two key points are
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important to develop Gramsci’s state. First was the argument drawn from Daniel
Halevy’s Decadence da la liberte that the most significant events in French history were
due to initiatives by private organisms, not by political organisms deriving from universal
suffrage.93 The second argument emerged in response to Ferdinand Lassalle’s notion of
the ‘State as Gendarme,’ which was— from Gramsci’s perspective— a phase in a state’s
evolution toward regulated society, but one that is self-eliminating by design.94 Both
arguments have several implications. In regard to the first, the agency and saliency of
private organisms necessitated for Gramsci a conception of the state that encompassed
non-governmental institutions and activities. This does not diminish the possibility of an
apparatus of state coercive power able to legally enforce discipline on those groups that
do not consent either actively or passively— to a point.95 But it implies the limit of
conceptualizing a state on the sole basis of its coercive element; that is, to neglect the
sphere of culture, of hegemony, of spontaneous consent. Gramsci’s state, in other words,
includes what one would think of as the traditional sphere of government, but also a
separate sphere representative of the thoughts and feelings of the masses. The
combination of this latter ‘ideological’ sphere alongside the former coercive element
leads to Gramsci’s general formula: state = political society + civil society.96
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With regard to Lassalle, emphasis on a state’s protective functions is both
problematic and instructive. Gramsci’s idea of an ethical state was one that put an end to
the internal divisions of the ruled and created a technically and morally unitary social
organism.97 Gramsci imagined the realization of such a political existence occurring
through the following process: passage from,
“A phase in which state will equal government and state will be identified with
civil society to a phase of the state as nightwatchman, ie. of a coercive
organization which will safeguard the development of the continually
proliferating elements of regulated society and which will therefore progressively
reduce its own authoritarian and forcible interventions.”98
In other words, after a war of ideas has been waged in civil society and a reconfiguration
of hegemonic relations has taken place, government will reflect the state in the same way
the state reflects civil society. This will present an initially precarious moment for
whichever social groups are responsible for hegemonic reconfiguration, and a coercive
state element will be necessary to ensure pockets of dissent are not able to mount
counter-revolutionary assaults. Here, the protective and coercive state is also essential so
that ideas reflective of the new hegemonic arrangement— ie., ideas pointed toward
regulated society— can take root. As these ideas become prominent/hegemonic— and
this is the point of contention between Gramsci and Lassalle— the need for a coercive
state apparatus diminishes and the state itself becomes increasingly reflected by a
regulated society.
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Gramsci problematizes Lassalle’s gendarme state because for Gramsci a coercive
and protective state is only a pathway to a higher level of social existence. The coercive
state is not reflective of an end by itself but is rather a means more or less valuable
depending on the historical circumstance. Therefore, applied as an overarching definition
of state— one ill-equipped to explain state processes and functions beyond those related
to protection, and one for which notions of advancement toward an ethical state do not
correspond with diminished reliance on force— Lassalle’s gendarme is inadequate. The
instructive value in Gramsci’s discussion of Lassalle is that it brings attention not only to
different concepts of state, but also to different manifestations of political power. On one
hand, he concedes that under certain circumstances force will be necessary, ie. the initial
post-revolutionary moment just mentioned. But on the other hand, Gramsci’s civil society
introduces into readers’ consciousnesses the idea of political change being affected—
fundamentally, initially— in the realm of ideas. The earlier discussion of intellectuals and
education begins to illustrate how this process occurs.
The overarching point which the example of Gramsci’s state contributes to is that
Gramsci injected nuance into models and labels used to understand political
circumstances and behavior; this is especially true for civil society and ways in which
political outcomes can be cultivated from within it. Related in more concrete terms to the
subject at hand, this requires understanding civil society in Jordan, not as something
permanently one-directional or delimited on the basis of location, but rather as a
something dynamic and all-encompassing— or, at least with the potential to prompt allencompassing political change. In alignment with the four-tiered argument outlined at the
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outset of this section, this analytical approach demands consideration of how institutions
and activities (patron-clientelism) within Jordanian civil society reflect the nature of civil
society— ie., its general trajectory— and interests of dominant fundamental social
groups. Equipped with an understanding of how social forms can reinforce themselves,
one can develop an informed critical posture toward existing hegemonic configurations
so that reconfiguration is possible.
An important discussion from Gramsci that extends this theme— ie. the endeavor
to register the intricacies of political life vis-à-vis particular institutions, civil society, the
state in general— is his notion of caesarism. While caeserism itself relates to a historical
moment where conflicting forces in hegemonic competition balance each other so as to
eventuate internecine destruction and an either progressive or reactionary intervention
must arbitrate resolution,99 one can extrapolate some of Gramsci’s descriptive terms. For
instance, when Gramsci suggests it would be an error in method to conceptualize
caesarism as the result of an equilibrium of the fundamental forces, and that one must
also see the interplay of auxiliary forces,100 this notion has broader applicability to social
forces that emerge from civil society.
Earlier the argument was made that intellectuals either are or are not contributors
to the existing hegemonic arrangement. This is true in terms of post-hoc characterization
appropriate for intellectuals or for the political party— what Gramsci called ‘the
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collective intellectual’— but one must be careful to avoid falling into the idea that social
forces originate in such a way that can be categorized in binary terms— ie., hegemonic
and counter-hegemonic. This would be a misleading characterization for two reasons. In
the first case, social groupings do not form on the basis of intentional support or
opposition to existing hegemonic arrangements. Rather, they form on the basis of
relations of forces: “The level of development of the material forces of production
provides a basis for the emergence of the various social groupings, represents a function
and has a specific position within production itself.”101
Gramsci would argue that social groups form first at the economic-corporate level
and gain awareness of their own situation and interests in relation to the existing
hegemonic arrangement only after passing through a process of political maturation.
Having matured, “one becomes aware that one’s own corporate interests, in their present
and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the merely economic group… it
marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of superstructures; it is the
phase in which previously germinated ideologies become ‘party.’”102
The process through which social groups form, cluster and develop into parties is
not one, therefore, that originates as a coherent, broadly relatable challenge of existing
relations of hegemony. It begins with interests that are much more intimate, diverse and
dynamic. Because of this intricacy, it would be misleading to suggest that processes of
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hegemonic reconfiguration occur with regard to agreement or disagreement about the
same interests, in binary, dichotomous competition. With regard to Gramsci’s
caesarism— which, one could appropriately label as a moment in processes of hegemonic
reconfiguration occurrent in civil society— his mention of auxiliary groups alludes to the
complexity within civil society generally. To neglect this complexity within civil society
would be to misrepresent it and misunderstand its processes.
The second reason why binary notions of hegemony and counter-hegemony are
unproductive is because hegemony itself represents a process. To suggest a hegemon and
counter-hegemon would be to suggest that the process of hegemony has been completed.
That would mean the ideologies of the dominant fundamental social groups had been
thoroughly disseminated, that the material forces of production reflected their interests
and, similarly, that political and civil society reflected consent to their leadership. Under
this circumstance, one could imagine a rebellion, an oppositional force versus an
incumbent force, a hegemon and a counter-hegemon.
But Gramsci describes the cultivation and diminishment of hegemony differently.
As far as cultivation of hegemony occurs,
“The life of the state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and
superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the fundamental groups
and those of subordinate groups… in real history these moments imply each other
reciprocally… combining and diverging in various ways.”103
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Gramsci provides no examples of hegemony realized in total as a permanent thing, but
instead draws attention to particular moments of hegemonic arrangement. These he uses
to articulate opportunities and risks within particular circumstances for political change.
The diminishment of hegemony, on the other hand, occurs as the dominant fundamental
group no longer expands, fails to assimilate new elements and begins to disintegrate.104
These processes, of hegemonic cultivation and diminishment, do not appear strictly
reactive to one another— as hegemony vs. counter-hegemony implies. Instead they
appear much more to be the result of fundamental groups’ ability or inability to meet the
needs of subordinate groups; or, in other words, the consent a fundamental group is able
or unable to garner in civil society.
These notions of state and caesarism, therefore, carry similar lessons about both
Gramsci’s methodology and the complexity of hegemonic competition in civil society.
Related to the complexity of hegemonic competition in civil society, it is important to
reiterate that Gramsci saw the longevity of any particular hegemonic arrangement as a
matter in constant relation with the satisfaction of interests of subordinate social groups.
This implies a perpetual competition within which as one cluster of dominant
fundamental groups increasingly neglect the interests of subordinate groups, those
subordinate groups become more likely to assert themselves or appeal to other larger
groups and be assimilated by them. This notion will become especially important in
discussions of the role of patrons in the next section.
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In terms of broader methodological application, two lessons emerge: In the first
case, Gramsci’s state and caesarism represent a tendency to look deep within social or
political phenomena to identify points of origin of interests. This reflects a bottom-up
approach to understanding— a necessary account of the nuances within— formation of
social groups, of parties and of aspirations for altering existing arrangements of
hegemony. It would be impossible to characterize these various processes— that is, the
various ways various groups vie for dominance— in strictly binary, dichotomous terms.
Secondly, one can infer from the present discussion the insufficiency of analysis centered
on only the functional attributes of patron-clientelism. Besides, the wealth of scholarship
referred to in the literature review has sufficiently categorized historical functional
manifestations of patron-clientelism. More important, to channel Gramsci, is a registry of
the various ways in which patron-clientelism functions in the service of particular
fundamental groups and, likewise, determination of whether those services also satisfy
the interests of subordinate groups. This links back to the conceptual theme of this
chapter that institutions and processes of civil society reflect the prominent direction of
political agency within it, as well as of the state generally.
The second conceptual theme derived from Gramsci, also one that helps
understand civil society in terms of how its institutions reflect the interests of the
dominant fundamental groups as well the means through which those institutions can be
redirected, is that of unification and universalization. The process through which socials
groups mature toward party life was introduced earlier, but further understanding for
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what happens in the absence of unification can be drawn from Gramsci’s Some Aspects of
the Southern Question.
Gramsci’s bones of contention with the Italian communist party during the 1920s
indicated by his remarks on the Italian south are twofold. The Turin communists— ie.
northern Italian communists and spokesmen of communism in Italy, generally
speaking— held the position that the success of communism in Italy depended on
emancipation of the northern proletariat from capitalist slavery so as to then later
emancipate the southern peasant masses. 105 This they saw as essential in order to increase
southern agricultural production and orient northern industrial production toward work
which promoted peace and brotherhood.106 But the first problem, related particularly to
the Turin communists, was that despite calls for north-south solidarity, their attitudes
toward southerners represented the influence of bourgeoisie education.107 ‘Southernist’
literature emanating from Northern communists reflected a pejorative frame of mind
toward the south, characterized southerners as ‘biologically inferior beings’ and the south
as Italy’s ‘ball and chain that prevented social development.’108 So one of the
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preventative factors impeding the Turin communists from unifying with their southern
counterparts was the problem of how to modify the political stance and general ideology
of the proletariat as a national element unconsciously subjected to the influence of
bourgeoisie education.109 In Gramsci’s mind, for the proletariat to become capable of
governing— for unification to be possible— it needed to strip itself of corporatism and
prejudice.110
The problem of north-south unification was, at its core, one related to the
influence of an institution that shaped attitudes and ideologies to the advantage of the
fundamental dominant social group. Having been subjected to bourgeoisie education,
northern communists developed subconscious prejudices against the south and believed
that southern emancipation was only possible with northern assistance. In other words,
the northern communists believed they needed to do for the southerners what the
southerners could not do for themselves. This also implied the priority of northern
emancipation because to attempt emancipation alongside or in collaboration with the
southerners would be to jeopardize its potential for success.
This serves an apt example to extend the discussion from the last chapter about
the political function of intellectuals and education. The effect of bourgeoisie intellectuals
and processes of education that took place in Italy during the 1920s had definitive
political outcomes. In Joseph Buttigieg’s commentary, it caused “civil society to became
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sick, culturally impoverished, politically impotent, lacking the moral fiber to resist
demagogic onslaught.”111 Ultimately, the forma mentra— the general cultural frame of
mind, the attitudes and ideas prevalent in Italians— cultivated through education by
Italy’s dominant fundamental social group fomented prejudice and disunity that
eventuated the failure of the communist party.
As a broader thematic result of communist disunity in Italy, and one related to
Gramsci’s second criticism of Italian communist strategy, southern marginalization
perpetuated economic circumstances that reinforced the prevalence of ‘old types of
intellectuals.’112 This is a more complex problematic and helps explain the relationship
between what Gramsci called the structural and superstructural elements of society.
Because Italian communist strategy in the 1920s centered on northern emancipation as a
presupposition to the empowerment of the south, communists did not aggressively pursue
division of big estates in the south. Similar to the advice they gave the workers at Fiat and
Reggio Emilia, the Turin communists believed transfer of ownership— in the case of the
factory workers from their board, in the case of the southern peasants from their
landowners— to cooperative management would leave the workers reliant on the
bourgeois state.113
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In the case of the factory workers they saw Fiat being cut off from institutions of
credit controlled by the bourgeoisie, thus placing the workers at the mercy of the
bourgeoisie and turning the Turin proletariat into an appendage of the bourgeoise state.114
For the southern peasants, they saw no value turning unskilled workers loose on
uncultivated land without tools or credit from landowners. A 3 January 1920 passage
from L’Ordine Nuove probably not written by Gramsci affirms:
“Without Machinery, without accommodation on the place of work, without
credit to tide him over till harvest-time, without co-operative institutions to
acquire the harvest (if— long before harvest time— the peasant has not hung
himself from the strongest bush or the least unhealthy-looking wild fig in the
undergrowth of his uncultivated land!) and preserve him from the clutches of the
usurers— without all these things, what can a poor peasant achieve by
occupying?”115
Awaiting northern emancipation in hopes of their own, southern peasants were
solidified within a parasitic semi-feudal agrarian bloc. It consisted of three social layers:
the peasants, an amorphous and disintegrated mass; medium rural bourgeoisie, the social
group from which a majority of the southern intellectuals emerged; and, the big
landowners. 116 Had the south matured beyond a feudal economic circumstance reliant on
agriculture, to organize commerce its dominant class would have bred a particular type of
intellectual organizer that specialized in applied science.117 This would have been
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essential in order to remain competitive in advanced economic circumstances. Because
this was not the case for the south, the old type of intellectual prevailed; he was the small
landowner, the medium rural bourgeoisie.
At this social layer— not far off from the peasant and in constant pursuit of
upward mobility— the intellectuals derived a fierce antipathy to the peasant who they
regarded as a machine for work to be bled dry, and one which can be replaced, given the
excess of the population.118 In this arrangement, the southern intellectual served as
intermediary between the peasant and big landowner, acting as land administrators, rent
collectors or bureaucrats. (As an interesting side note, southern intellectuals, the
intermediaries of the south, made up more than three fifths of the state bureaucracy, a
striking parallel to the nearly 80 percent of Jordan’s GDP accounted for by its public
sector.119) This created a,
“Monstrous agrarian bloc, which as a whole functioned as the intermediary and
overseer of Northern capitalism and banks; big southern landowners relied upon
the Northern industrial bourgeoisie for machinery, tools, etc. Its single aim was to
preserve the status quo. Within it, there existed no intellectual light, no program,
no drive towards improvements or progress.”120
Several important points can be drawn from Gramsci’s discussion of southern
intellectuals. Because of prejudice and disunity within the communist party, no creative
attempts were made to alter or improve the southern economic situation. No one in the
north saw altering the southern economy as a necessary step to liberating southern
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peasants because northerners were preoccupied with their own emancipation. So, the
feudal bloc that remained— what Gramsci could have referred to as the ‘structure’ of the
south— had a direct impact on the nature of intellectual the south produced and the type
of organization that stemmed from him. This enabled the old type of intellectual just
described to serve as an ordering element in society, to solidify in peasants’ minds their
reliance on intellectuals as intermediaries, to cultivate a general ideology supportive of
the status quo.
These are what Gramsci would have referred to as superstructural elements that
existed in a dialectical, reinforcing relationship with the economic structure. The fact that
the communist party in Italy was unable to unify and dismantle the economic structure in
the south meant that it was also unable to unseat the type of intellectual common in the
south and the organization to be expected from the old intellectuals. One could speculate
about what might have happened had large estates been transferred into co-ops and the
relevance of old intellectuals had waned. This could have empowered a different—
potentially oppositional— intellectual in the south, helped dismantle the agrarian bloc,
undermined the northern bourgeoisie, and reduced the influence of the bourgeoisie in
total. If that had been the case, perhaps the proletariat would have had greater success in
becoming a national element and at preventing the rise of fascism.
This discussion of unification and southern Italy is important with regard to the
overarching topic of civil society because it demonstrates— again— complexity in terms
of points of origins of interests as well as competition and relations between various
social stratum. It also indicated how disunity prevents a movement from presenting a
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serious challenge to the status quo. But more deeply, it shows how what happens in civil
society— ie. what intellectuals gain prominence, what type of societal organization they
make likely— is closely intertwined with economic circumstance. In the next chapter,
when these ideas in abstract are given concrete examples with different manifestations of
patron-clientelism, this will notion will apply directly. In the case of Italy, economic
circumstances perpetuated the influence of intellectuals who worked more to sustain the
status quo than to elevate the situation of the masses.
Related to the fundamental argument of this chapter, that the agency of particular
institutions reflect and define civil society as well as the overall nature of state political
hegemony, it seems clear that the organizational role southern intellectuals played as
intermediaries between peasants and landowners indicated a definite and representational
institution. As mentioned, it reflected a similar intermediary relationship between the
agrarian bloc in the south and the northern industrial bourgeoisie, and so the overall
dominance of the bourgeoisie in general. These are the fundamental insights to be drawn
from Gramsci’s Some Aspects of the Southern Question. Similar lessons will be
discernable from Gramsci’s last important theme related to critical culture.
The cultivation of critical culture, for Gramsci, is one of the essential steps toward
hegemonic reconfiguration. It presupposes an understanding of the complexities within
civil society, awareness of how institutions function within civil society in the direction
of a particular political end and of how a unified effort can redirect them. But
fundamentally, for Gramsci, a critical culture means that the state can be criticized,
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“precisely in order to develop and produce new forms of state life.”121 This implies the
development of a new outlook on political life, the conception of an ideational challenge
against incumbent arrangements of hegemony and their products. Gramsci describes this
as a cyclical process in which,
“The development of the party and state into a conception of the world, ie. into a
total and molecular transformation of ways of thinking and acting, reacts upon the
state and the party, compelling them to reorganize continually and confronting
them with new and original problems to solve.”122
In order to fully understand this process, and the ways in which a critical culture
can have the effect of reorganizing hegemonic relations, two points of consideration are
relevant: first, defensive strategies that fundamental groups employ in order to prevent
the rise of a critical culture that might jeopardize them; second, processes and
mechanisms through which critical culture can be cultivated.
One of the most striking references related to the subject at hand found in the
Hoare/Smith edition of Gramsci’s prison notes is mention in a footnote of a speech given
by Benito Mussolini on 26 May 1927. In the speech, Mussolini was addressing the
question of whether opposition within a state was necessary in order to ensure efficiency
of the state. This was his response: “Here the problem arises: but how do you manage to
do without an opposition? Opposition is not necessary to the functioning of a healthy
political regime. Opposition is stupid, superfluous in a totalitarian regime like the Fascist
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regime.”123 Although Mussolini was speaking on behalf of a very specific type of
hegemonic configuration, this sentiment can be extrapolated to explain the psychology of
dominant groups in general. It would not be in the interests of the Italy’s Fascist
government to participate in the cyclical process described above in which political
circumstances— ie. particular hegemonic arrangements— came in repeated contact with
new ways of thinking and then were forced to react and accommodate them.
Totalitarianism itself implies the absence of accountability, so this would present a
feeling of existential jeopardization. But put in more broadly relatable terms, it is in the
interest of any dominant fundamental group that the interests of its members and
auxiliary members are met by its party, precluding the need for them to appeal to other
parties. Related to civil society, Gramsci suggests that “it always happens that individuals
belong to more than one association… an ‘all embracing and unifying’ policy is aimed at
ensuring that the members of a particular party find in that party all the satisfaction that
they formerly found in a multiplicity of organizations.”124 A dominant fundamental group
can ensure the needs of their members and auxiliary members are met by destroying or
incorporating other organizations. This is one way in which the prevention of a critical
culture can take place.
But one would be remiss not acknowledge that this is a process with
multidirectional application. It would be equally in the interest of an oppositional group
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to meet the needs of as many subsidiary groups as possible in order to cultivate a ‘new
culture’ with broad appeal. This relates directly to the recent discussion of the Italian
south. Had the communists been able to unify in Italy, had their party gained control over
industrial and agricultural means of production, it would have been in conflict with their
interests to allow— say, for example— the continued functionality of bourgeoisie banks
and creditors. This would position the bourgeoisie in such a way that would enable them
to serve workers’ needs, increasing the likelihood of proletariat dependence on them and
potential for workers to defect to the bourgeoisie camp. One could make a similar
ideational argument in the abstract. If it is the case that oppositional intellectuals are
cultivating a new culture critical to existing arrangements of hegemony, it would be
counterintuitive to their interests to let themselves be assimilated by the dominant
fundamental groups or be out shined by some conglomerate of competing oppositional
intellectuals. This would quickly render their party useless. So, from two directions, as a
defensive and offensive mechanism, a way of preventing the formation of a critical
culture and a way of bolstering a new critical culture is by ensuring a party meets needs
as broadly as possible, so that other supplemental parties are unneeded.
A second way dominant groups can reinforce their position by making the
emergence of new critical culture difficult is through the use of their negative coercive
functions. Implied here is that this is not a multi-directional tactic available to rising
oppositional groups because they would not have reached a point— when it would be
necessary to defend their critical view of the state— where they would have control over
both civil and political societies. Nascent social groups, as discussed throughout this
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thesis, must first pursue success on the field of ideas in civil society, and only later can
manipulate political society in reflection of their interests. One way dominant groups can
apply institutions in political society to defend their ideational positions is through the
negative educational function of the law. Gramsci suggested that, “If a state tends to
create and maintain a certain type of civilization, and to eliminate certain customs and
attitudes and disseminate others, then the law will be its instrument for this purpose.”125
This should not be understood to mean that the law functions to punish people so as to
force one particular frame of mind upon them. Rather, Gramsci saw the educative
function of law as a means of preventing ‘cultural dangerousness.’126 In other words, if
employed deftly, institutions in political society can be directed so as to shape the flow of
ideas in civil society, ensuring they do not come into conflict with the forma mentra
reflective of the existing hegemonic relations of the state. A similar theme can be
extended from the discussion in the last chapter about education. Schools and
universities, if given free range, have the potential to become hotbeds of oppositional
thinking. But if controlled closely they become an extension of state bureaucracy; the
bureaucratic hierarchy replaces the intellectual and political hierarchy.127 In the cases of
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both law and education, a dominant fundamental group is able to employ functions in
political society to influence ideas— in particular, critical ideas— in civil society.128
From the opposite direction, there are several points to consider in characterizing
ways a critical culture can be cultivated so that hegemonic reconfiguration becomes
possible. This begins with the party. According to Gramsci, the role of the party is not to
provide “simply a mechanical and passive expression of [its] classes, but react
energetically upon them in order to develop, solidify and universalize them.”129 If the
party— at least initially— reflects the interests of a particular class, the way in which
those interests are articulated is likely to be in comparison with the status quo. If the
needs of a particular class had already been met, the class would have been assimilated
amongst the auxiliaries of a larger class and formation of a party would not have been
necessary in the first place. So, the party— conceptualized as the collective intellectual—
necessarily carries with it the function of cultivating a critical culture, one that views the
product of the current arrangement of hegemonic relations lacking and itself as the
purveyor of improved conditions.
A related component in the cultivation of a critical culture, which offers
specification to comparison of the status quo just mentioned, is for a newly rising social
group to present an unequivocal critique of the past. When Gramsci describes the process
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of a social group founding a new state, he suggests that initially the hegemonic content of
that social group is predominantly of an economic order. In this circumstance the
superstructural elements associated with this newly hegemonic social group are few in
number, but the cultural policy they project must necessarily be a negative critique of the
past.130 In other words, it is not enough for a newly formed social group to present an
idea about economic reordering that they believe is more substantial than ordering of the
present circumstance.
Taking a step further, the new social group must present their economic ideas
alongside a forma mentra that— while perhaps not fully conceptualized at the outset— is
necessarily critical of the past. The example Gramsci gives of this going wrong is the
mediaeval communes because despite their innovative ideas about economics, culture
remained a function of the church; the church was anti-economic in character and so its
culture was not directed toward allowing the communes to gain hegemony, but rather
preventing them from acquiring it.131 This demonstrates that a new social group must
ensure that its culture, the frame of mind and superstructural elements that contribute to
its economic reasons for forming in the first place, is opposed to the status quo and
critical of hegemonic arrangements of the past. Without this posture, potential auxiliary
members will be unsure why the social group formed or uphold a cultural frame of mind
counterintuitive to its existence.
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As a party forms and aspires to dominance, attempts to cultivate as broad a base
of appeal as possible, attempts to pose itself in contrast to the present and as an
improvement on the past, another key aspect of this process is that it assimilates as
principles of moral conduct the rules which will be legal obligations in the state.132 This
is the final and overarching theme related to the cultivation of a critical culture so that
hegemonic reordering becomes possible, but one that again involves the superstructural
components of a party. In order for a rising party to gain significance and membership it
is necessary for people join it, in the first case, because they imagine their immediate
economic needs being met, and in the second case because they register its tenets, the
core cultural platforms and ideas of the party as being morally palatable. This could
require a re-education process, but if a compelling case is made against the past or the
status quo, it would not necessarily be a difficult one.
This links back to some fundamental themes of this chapter. In the first case, it
serves as reminder that gains hoped for with regard to society as a whole or political
society in particular are only accessible after a war of ideas in civil society has been won.
It would be much more difficult to inculcate in people as principles of moral conduct
rules that already existed through a top down approach reliant more on coercion than on
the cultivation of consent. As Gramsci often repeats, coercion and domination by force
are not the most effective means of control and subordination in society.133 This also
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serves as a reminder that the content of civil society, the political agency that stems from
actors within it, provides a clearer source of characterization for civil society than
reference to its location. None of the discussions in this chapter would have gone very far
if each one circled back to emphasis on behavior in a ‘private sphere’ in relation to
overarching political circumstances. Instead, this chapter should have demonstrated that a
significant interrelation exists between activity in what is called civil society, economic
activity in a state, and the overall political circumstances of a state. To delimit these
‘spheres’ into superficial and easily managed categories would be to overlook the
intricacies of their intersectionalities.
Ultimately, this chapter was intended to show that the relationship between civil
society and the society overall, the relationship between civil society, are mutually
reinforcing. Civil society can reflect the dominant fundamental social groups who hold
sway over political society, can reinforce their position and can act in a preventative
mechanism against the rise of opposition. On the other hand, civil society is the only
place in which opposition to a state can originate, especially in advanced and modern
economies. If these things are true, then defining civil society on the basis of anything
other than its content— that is the political agency of actors within it— is to be
superficial and reductionist. Understanding the complexity of civil society, its outward
interrelation and the dominance reflected by institutions within it is essential.
Related to the subject of patron-clientelism, this chapter should also demonstrate
that more important than the different ways or spheres in which patron-clientelism
functions is the outcome of that ensemble of functionality. In other words, patron77

clientelism can serve purposes that cross political, economic and social spheres— all of
which have attachments to civil society— but deeper analysis strives to uncover the
product of that functionality. Realizing which direction that functionality points helps
understand political agency in civil society and overall political dominance in a state.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PATRON-CLIENTELISM IN JORDAN

Taking into consideration the preceding chapters, one should not be left with the
impression that concepts drawn from Gramsci offer ready-made explanations or solutions
to contemporary problems in Jordan, related to civil society in general or patronclientelism in particular. Instead, as Buttigieg reminds us, Gramscian concepts, like those
introduced here, should serve to animate inquiries into the present condition of civil
society, offering clues of where to look.134 What follows is a characterization not of the
different ways in which patron-clientelism functions, but rather the effect of its
functionality. Several fundamental questions will need answering: 1) In Jordan, does the
role of patrons in civil society— the salience of wasta— reflect and reinforce current
overarching arrangements of political hegemony— ie. dominance of the monarchy, tribes
and influential families— or operate in opposition to them? 2) Do economic
circumstances in Jordan indicate likelihood of particular organizing elements or
intellectuals predominant within civil society? 3) Is the ability of patrons to meet clients’
needs expanding or diminishing; what implications or opportunities does this reflect for
the current hegemonic ordering?
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Before delving into these questions, as a conceptual presupposition, the remainder
of this chapter will hold the function of patrons in Jordan parallel to the role of organic
intellectuals; it will characterize patrons as intellectuals. This comparison is persuasive
because both patrons and organic intellectuals elaborate a worldview that then is
disseminated as an organizing element in civil society for the purpose of manufacturing
or solidifying consent in contradiction to or in support of existing hegemonic ordering.
Patrons in Jordan provide an organizational element in society in the sense that they
establish the rules clients must play by in order to sustain their patron-client relationship.
But these rules are not just imagined ad hoc, they reflect a historically engrained vertical
structure that connects patrons operating at the lowest levels within civil society to the
highest, and even into political society. Another point of similarity between the organic
intellectual and the Jordanian patron is that, like the entrepreneur, the patron is well
acquainted with knowledge and people that extend beyond his immediate corporate
purview. A patron in Jordan is only as effective as he is able to serve the needs of his
clients and so by necessity must be outward informed and oriented. Further points of
comparison could be made, but for now others can be left to elaboration in later
examples.
As a secondary preliminary remark before engaging in a brief study of Jordan,
justification for choosing Jordan is worth mentioning. The reasons are as follows: First,
accessibility provided an incentive because interviews conducted between June and
August of 2018 will be relied upon— in part— as primary sources for this chapter.
Secondly, Jordan presents a unique study because it is a Muslim-majority state. This is
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valuable because analysis of institutions in civil society helps demonstrate their salience
in sustaining the existing social, economic and political order, compared to the imagined
adverse implications of Islam. If, operating from the Islamophobic presumptions of
orientalism that religion is inextricably linked to all aspects of life in Muslim-majority
countries and thus religion is culpable for social, political and economic
underdevelopment, Jordan is a good place to be proven wrong. Lastly, Jordan is situated
at the heart of the Middle East and is deeply affected by the historic conflict between
Israel and Palestine, as well as the more recent turmoil experienced in Iraq and Syria.
One could describe Jordan as a cultural melting pot, with rich Bedouin and Palestinian
heritage, and more recently an increasingly influential influx of Syrian culture.
Interaction and differing stature between social groups, to include racial prejudice often
imposed against Jordanians of Palestinian origin, contribute to a dynamic social
environment rich for analysis. If something important can be understood about civil
society and patron-clientelism in Jordan, it might provide a roadmap for analysis of other
nation-state systems within the Middle East.
Perhaps the easiest to answer of the three questions posed at the outset of this
chapter is the second- the question relating to the overall economic circumstance in
Jordan and what it means for the role of intellectuals. Jordan’s economic circumstance
can be inferred best from reform efforts articulated by Marwan Muasher in his National
Agenda: 2006-2015: The Jordan We Strive For. 135 It is important to note that this was a
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government document produced by Mr. Muasher during his tenure as the Deputy Prime
Minister of Jordan and because of this document Mr. Muasher was dismissed. One could
say about the termination of Mr. Muasher’s government employment that the ideas he
proposed in order to boost economic efficiency would have jeopardized the otherwise
uninterrupted political lives and practices of the ruling elite. Although this does not
provide an example of patron-clientelism per se, it does reflect how institutions— in this
case, norms related to behavior appropriate for government officials— shape ideas about
common practices and marginalize ideas deemed uncommon. As an ultimate result of Mr.
Muasher’s dismissal and the rejection of this document, many of the reform efforts
pursued today relate to problems his report was— more than ten years ago— intended to
address.
Mr. Muasher’s report can be summarized with the following paragraph: Jordan’s
continued economic and political improvement depends on the quality and effectiveness
of its public administration. Major steps are required to develop a public service focused
on delivery results and founded upon merit. The National Agenda aims to improve the
quality of life for Jordanians, build a strong economy, and guarantee basic freedoms and
human rights and strengthen democracy and cultural and political pluralism. The National
Agenda is founded upon Jordan’s Constitution and a conviction that political
development is implicit in comprehensive economic, social, cultural, and administrative
development. Reforms directed by the Agenda must create a favorable investment
environment, fiscal discipline, internal political stability, administrative development,
justice accountability, transparency, labor policies, vocational training, employment
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support, minimum wage, maximum working hours, economic competitiveness, freedom
of capital movement, reduction of trade barriers, support for small and medium sized
enterprises and quality education.
Phase One of the National Agenda requires the formulation of regulatory
legislation, elimination of discrimination against women, liberalization of state-controlled
markets and investment in key infrastructure. Phase Two will promote capital-intensive
industries and induce the newly educated workforce into value-added jobs. In this phase
partisan life and political pluralism are expected to develop. In Phase Three selected
economic sectors in the knowledge economy will be developed.
On can draw from this document that a sense of urgency was felt, then and to a
greater degree now, on the development of domestic, self-sustainable industries,
particularly with eventual emphasis on a knowledge economy. This is a reasonable
response to the fact that Jordan’s debt as of 2016 reached $35.1b and represented 93.4%
of its GDP.136 International factors, such as the influx of Syrian refugees and regional
turmoil leading to a decrease in tourism, have accentuated Jordan’s economic
vulnerability. But, as the report also indicates, a bloated and inefficient public sector also
contributes to Jordan’s economic insolvency. This explains efforts to emphasize
accountability, transparency and merit, and is also indicated by the fact that the public
sector accounts for roughly 77% of Jordan’s GDP.137
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Acknowledging the obvious nuances as well as country and regionally specific
particularities, the point of comparison against which economic circumstance in Jordan
can be understood is the earlier discussion of southern Italy. Economic circumstances in
southern Italy were such that there was not a significant push for intellectuals— both of
the organic and traditional sorts— to pursue economic innovation. A stage of capitalism
had not been reached in which they presented a necessity. Jordan now is scrambling to
innovate and diversify its economy, harvesting as many capital producing, STEM
oriented intellectuals as possible, but these initiatives are fresh and the entrenchment of
old types of intellectuals is old.
One could assume, then, that is more likely that the dominant body of intellectuals
in Jordan continue to operate as they have, working counterintuitive to reform efforts and
in support of the status quo. This presents an obvious tension between the economic
structural elements in Jordanian society as they exist today, and what they need to
become in order for Jordan’s economy to survive. This implies, that as economic
circumstances are forced to evolve, the ability of patrons to serve the needs of their
clients— of intellectuals’ ability to organize society in alignment with Jordan’s economic
needs— will diminish. This reflects also the ability of the fundamental dominant groups
to meet the needs of its auxiliary or subordinate groups and an opportunity that might
emerge for hegemonic reconfiguration.
Another conclusion to draw from the National Agenda and the fact of its rejection
is that a problem of social unification existed at the time of its publication— and
considering a lack of substantial reforms, probably remains in existence today. This links
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back to the initial and causal element behind southern Italy’s poor economic
circumstance, which led to the perpetuated existence of old intellectuals and regressive
feudalistic norms. It was because of the northerners’ prejudicial ideas about southerners
that the Turin communists were unsuccessful at elaborating a national ideology capable
to unify the party. A point of comparison for Jordan, with reference to the National
Agenda, is the role of women. Still a vastly patriarchal society, in Jordan women hold
only fifteen percent of the national parliament;138 relatedly, seventy-four percent of
Jordanians believe men are better at political leadership than women and fifty-eight
percent also agree that husbands should have the final say in decisions concerning the
family.139
This seems to represent a similar disunity to that based on prejudicial thinking
identified by Gramsci in the Italian south. In Italy, it was the case that because of a
disdainful attitude toward the south, Turin, ie. northern communists were unable to
elaborate a national platform that enable north-south unification. Because of this lack of
unification, southern Italians were trapped in an anachronistic and semi-feudalistic
economic structure that perpetuated their reliance on the bourgeois state. Similarly,
antiquated gender norms in Jordan exclude women from its workforce and perpetuate
economic circumstances that are at best unproductive and at worst on an inevitable
collision course towards insolvency.
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Related to the larger themes of this thesis, though, it means that institutions can
and do create and shape norms that govern political behavior. It would be difficult to
attribute prejudices toward women in Jordan to one causal root over others, but the thrust
of this argument reinforces the claims made about the function of patron-clientelism in
civil society. Patron-clientelism both reflects and shapes how people imagine politics
functioning under normal circumstances. The fact of appealing to a patron to gain
government access— for paperwork, privileges, etc.— is understood broadly as how
politics in Jordan function. To push back against that system would be to act
counterintuitive to a frame of mind engrained broadly in Jordanian society, in opposition
to the social forma mentra. Acting outside systems of patron-clientelism would perturb
the ruling elite because they would become immediately inundated by requests and
concerns articulated by the broader public, as opposed to the public being funneled
through patron networks on the basis of clients’ ability to access them. More importantly,
if the broader public felt empowered to heir its grievances directly to the government,
which incidentally is a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the Jordanian Constitution,
solidarity could be realized and a significant challenge to the ruling elite could be waged.
This offers one example of how patron-clientelism reflects an institution supportive of the
dominant fundamental groups in such a way that debilitates popular political movements
from below.
The second and third primary sources important to consult in order to answer the
questions outlined at the outset of this chapter both come from interviews conducted last
summer. Both relate to the nature of education in Jordan, which provides an important
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indication of how ideas are cultivated in society, but also how structures within society
tangibly reinforce Jordan’s hegemonic arrangements. The first interview comes from an
external perspective, a person not directly employed in academia, and discusses processes
of admission at the University of Jordan. The second interview comes from a traditional
academic and relates to how patron-clientelism influenced his prospects for employment,
publication and tenure. These interviews will be used to explain how patron-clientelism
in Jordan functions in the service of the fundamental dominant group— ie. the political
elite, monarchy, members of parliament, etc.— as well as its auxiliary groups— ie. what
could be referred to as the medium bourgeoisie, employees of the public sector.
During the interview between Amjad Tadros140 and the present author, Mr.
Tadros explained the effect of patron-clientelism on education and public sector
employment in Jordan. He described that the admittance process to the University of
Jordan was based largely on royal decree. The King determined the percentage of school
seats available to children of members of the armed forces, children of members of the
Ministry of Education and the children of parents employed by the UN. In simple terms,
parents of an applicant— the wasta of the parents, or the parents’ patronage— had more
to do with admittance than did test scores or other concrete measures of merit. The result
of this system of admission prompted a situation in which students would enroll in
classes but not have considerable interest or incentive to perform. If a student’s

140

Amjad Tadros is an entrepreneur and investigative journalist. He is the point person in the Middle East
for CBS news and has managed the network’s coverage and operations in the region since 1990. In 2001 he
was awarded an Emmy in investigative Journalism and in 2007 we received the Alfred Dupont Award for
excellency by the University of Columbia. He was the co-recipient of the Peabody award in 2008. (source:
IMDB)

87

underperformance resulted in poor grades, the student’s parents would appeal to the
teacher, and again through the process of patronage, ensure their student would not be
expelled. This resulted in a body of college graduates unemployable in terms of skills,
again reliant on their parents to find jobs. Most often, this meant appointment to mundane
ministerial positions. This, Mr. Tadros suggested, created a self-perpetuating cycle that
contributed to Jordan’s bloated public sector.141
This discussion with Mr. Tadros indicates that the accumulation of particular
incidents of patron-clientelism can and do have system level implications. In the first
case, it shows that institutionalized reliance on patron-clientelism in the process of
admission to the University of Jordan creates a barrier to entry for applicants without
parents employed in the public sector. For applicants from low socio-economic
backgrounds, this means the likelihood of access to education is minimal. In the second
case, persons employed by the Jordanian government, those whose children have a higher
likelihood of access to education and post-graduate employment, have little incentive to
suggest changes in admissions policies because they— or their children— will be most
directly and negatively affected. One could suggest that this presents a system of freeriding wherein the free-riders are most capable to change the system but to do so would
be at the detriment of their ability to ride free.
A tertiary but equally fundamental point to make about the system of patronclientelism in education that Mr. Tadros describes is that of the relationship between
Jordan’s structural and superstructural elements. As mentioned earlier, a significant
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portion of Jordan’s workforce is employed by the government. This represents a concrete
economic circumstance— a structure— that the system of patron-clientelism— a
superstructural element— reinforces. Also perpetuated in the minds of young Jordanians,
what one could think of as a process of assimilation— another superstructural element—
is the notion that through their parents’ patronage, employment is a given. This frame of
mind, this cultural perspective, this forma mentra disincentives innovation, initiative and
aspiration to something higher than a government job, for which salary is guaranteed and
responsibilities are minimal.
One could extrapolate how this relates to dominant fundamental groups and
existing arrangements of hegemony. Tribes, for example, whose loyalty was integral to
the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom and who continue to hold significant influence
in Jordan today, have traditionally opposed privatization because they see in it possibility
for corruption.142 Maintaining an educational system in which children of bureaucrats
become bureaucrats serves the present economic arrangement in which the public sector
dominates, as well as the perceived longevity of the current ruling elite. If, on the other
hand, entrance to the education system became strictly merit based and performance was
mandatory for continued enrollment, it is difficult to imagine ambitious graduates willing
to while away their professional lives serving in non-demanding government jobs. This
would upend the current relationship between Jordan’s economic structure and the
superstructural elements that support it.
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The second interview conducted this past summer offers a similar sentiment but
from a more personal and opposite perspective— that of an academic. Akram Al-Deek143
opened the conversation by saying in exasperation, “wasta affects everything in Jordan.”
Dr. Al-Deek explained how upon his arrival he struggled to find appointment at a
university, despite being credentialed in Europe and at a higher level than most of the
people he competed with for employment. He described working tirelessly to contact
Literature departments with job vacancies, but never heard back. Everyone had told Dr.
Al-Deek that people who facilitate by means of wasta are those who are in power and are
successful. This, he noted, was particularly true for tribes and members of parliament.
But Dr. Al-Deek was opposed to the concept of patron-clientelism because he wanted to
be responsible for his own accomplishments. As the semester approached and Dr. AlDeek became discouraged, his father went behind his back and contacted a friend who
happen to be employed at the University of Jordan. Dr. Al-Deek was granted an interview
and accepted a job offer shortly after.
Some time passed and Dr. Al-Deek became frustrated with the system at the
University of Jordan, so began looking for other opportunities. He happened to teach a
workshop that the daughter of the owner of The Middle East University in Jordan
attended; she forwarded his name to her father and he was offered employment. A few
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years later, Dr. Al-Deek’s friend began working at the American University of Madaba,
he heard it was a more liberal environment with a better curriculum, and so asked her to
put his name in with the dean. Again, Dr. Al-Deek was offered employment.
With regard to publication, Dr. Al-Deek said that the process could be incredibly
slow; if you submit a paper without knowing anyone it can get lost in a pile. He has been
trying to publish a paper for the last year and has yet to hear a definitive response. The
only exception to this all-encompassing influence of wasta that Dr. Al-Deek described
was in regard to promotion. Wasta is still important for professors hoping to be promoted
from Assistant to Associate, but that is not the case for professors moving from Associate
to full professorship. The rationale behind this exception, he explained, was because
professors at a higher level than Associate are rare and needed. For Associate professors
hoping to become full tenured professors the likelihood is higher to be promoted without
wasta and on the basis of merit.
Ultimately, Dr. Al-Deek has attempted to resist the influences of wasta as much
as possible. He realizes that wasta played an important role in his initial employment but
has worked hard to build a name for himself so as to be responsible for his own
accomplishments. He also realizes that he would probably be more successful if he
succumbed to the system of patron-clientelism in Jordan. But this he said would come at
a cost. In particular, he mentioned a previous landlord of his who had generously offered
to provide anything Dr. Al-Deek needed for his apartment. It was only later that Dr. AlDeek realized his landlord’s cousin was enrolled in one of Dr. Al-Deek’s classes. The
clear expectation was that Dr. Al-Deek would receive services from the landlord in
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exchange for passing his cousin. This was a compromise in integrity that Dr. Al-Deek
was unwilling undergo, and so was cautious not to make any requests of his landlord.144
Several important points can be drawn from this interview with Akram Al-Deek.
In the first case, it is striking that the same system of patron-clientelism that applies to
students also applies to teachers. Without his father’s initial intervention, it would have
taken Dr. Al-Deek considerably longer to find employment, if he had at all. For
unconnected academics without resources, prospects for employment exist on an uneven
playing field. This seems to have the structural implication that not only is the education
system shaped in order to perpetuate circumstances that produce students to the
advantage of the ruling elite, but also, teachers are equally swept into this structure and
their behavior is shaped accordingly. If teachers are unwilling to participate in the system
of patron-clientelism in order to access employment, publish scholarship or pursue
promotion from assistant to associate professor, that would also imply their unwillingness
to react favorably to parent patrons that attempted to pressure them. These are the types
of professors that would find difficulty gaining employment.
At surface level, this vignette indicates parallels to the claims made by Dr. Doyle
about Turkey, referenced in the Chapter Two. In Jordan’s education system, a microcosm
for broader political life in Jordanian civil society, it is the case that institutions— and
patron-clientelism, more specifically— reflect and reinforce the interests of the ruling
elite, the dominant fundamental social groups. This is indicated by the trends of
education and bureaucratic employment described by Mr. Tadros. Although civil society
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has the potential to be weaponized by oppositional groups, it is also the case that it can
function, in Gramsci’s words, as the ‘powerful system of fortresses and earthworks’
supportive of the state.145
On a more nuanced conceptual level, however, one could say that Dr. Al-Deek
represents an exception. If it is the fact that intellectuals are assimilated by the existing
arrangements of hegemonic relations in order to benefit the dominant fundamental social
groups, there are also those intellectuals— like Dr. Al-Deek— who choose not to play by
the rules. It serves as a rebuke to the present system of education in Jordan that Dr. AlDeek does not use or act as a wasta.
This links back to two fundamental themes of this thesis. Dr. Al-Deek represents
a critical approach to the existing arrangements of hegemonic ordering in Jordan. But
related to the non-binary nature of hegemonic competition described earlier, he does not
oppose wasta necessarily because it is a representative of functions attributable to
Jordanian government. It is true that patron-clientelism is an institution engrained in
Jordanian social and political life, but Dr. Al-Deek’s bone of contention with wasta is a
fact of integrity. He did not want to accept free services from his landlord because he
knew that he would become indebted to the landlord and enable his landlord’s cousin to
underperform.
If one wanted to think about this from a moral perspective, the early discussion of
instrumental and intrinsic goods offers a fair barometer. Accepting free services from his
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landlord and passing the landlord’s cousin— even if she did not show up to class—
would not present an intrinsic or an instrumental good. Absence of economic exchange
that usually would be involved in the services procurement from a landlord would not
serve any good to the landlord. Passing a student who does not show up for class because
of that student’s connections does not serve any good. If anything, this would
demonstrate an alienated good that in the long run would benefit neither Dr. Al-Deek nor
his landlord.
This also can be considered from the perspective of a relationship between a
professor and a student. A professor who invests his heart in his teaching and forms a
relationship with students based on mentorship and genuine interest in learning is one
who takes his craft seriously. Such a relationship, such a means of instruction would
represent an intrinsic good, a positive moral value. To willfully sacrifice that relationship
and that intrinsic good in accordance with norms emergent from institutions designed to
support the ruling elite would be a moral wrong.
The more profound point to be drawn from this interview, though, is that
oppositional currents can co-exist within institutions dominated by existing hegemonic
arrangements. This is what Dr. Al-Deek represents. He represents disillusionment with a
system, but ability to operate within it. Gramsci would argue that this is the only way to
cultivate a critical culture within civil society and upend the existing arrangements of
political dominance. Say, for example, that Dr. Al-Deek continues for the rest of his
career to deny attempts by parent patrons to procure grades for their children which the
children did not earn. Say Dr. Al-Deek was able to continue finding new employment, if
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he wished, continue being promoted and continue publishing without reliance on wasta
and instead reliance on his own merits. This behavior would be subversive to existing
norms related to the function of education, the function of politics and the nature of
Jordanian society in general and could represent a compelling starting point for the
cultivation of a culture oppositional to the status quo.
In a sense, a different sense than has been employed throughout the bulk of this
thesis, Dr. Al-Deek begins to represent a different type of patron and a new intellectual.
He as an instructor who refuses to act as a wasta draws students into a different type of
patron-client relationship— one that is oppositional to existing norms and practices
prevalent in Jordanian civil society. Realizing that grades would only be received from
Dr. Al-Deek on the basis of merit, students could enter into an educational relationship
with Dr. Al-Deek so that in exchange for their commitment to academic integrity they
would receive from him genuine, rigorous and quality education. This would empower
them to develop their own intellectual worth and ability to pursue educational
opportunities beyond undergraduate education, so as to potentially become educators and
patrons of their own. Once the value of this type of educational experience and pride in
having achieved academic accomplishments independently was realized broadly, that is
to say new institutions and frames of mind regarding education took root, the structural
economic element in Jordanian society would be forced to react.
In terms of the broader themes introduced in this chapter, patrons sharing
functional similarity to intellectuals— represented particularly in the case of academia—
demonstrate the salience of wasta as an institution that reinforces existing political
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circumstances in Jordan and overarching arrangements of political hegemony. The
economic circumstance in Jordan makes this a predictable reality. But there is both room
and opportunity for these circumstances to be upended by oppositional intellectuals,
which do exist— as Dr. Al-Deek represents. An irreconcilable tension exists between the
current needs met by patrons and the economic development required for Jordan to
remain solvent.
This means that the immediate advantages of patron-clientelism for children of
bureaucrats do not reflect a sustainable system capable of adapting to the inevitable
economic advancement Jordan needs to undergo. This makes people like Dr. Al-Deek
reflective of a new wave of patron, a new intellectual, capable of meeting the new needs
of ambitious students hoping to be informed and innovative. One can draw the
fundamental lesson from this section that despite the prevalence of patron-clientelism as a
salient and organizing principle for civil society and society in general in Jordan, its
current configuration is bound to erode. The new patron, the intellectual oppositional to
political and economic circumstances reflective of existing arrangements of hegemony is
imminent.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

These chapters have attempted to develop new ways to think about political and
economic circumstances in Jordan. They began with the argument that all literature
surrounding politics carries with it either implicit or explicit value judgements. This
served to push back against scholarship that emphasizes the dynamism of patronclientelism, as opposed to its potentially harmful manifestations. This last chapter in
particular demonstrated ways in which patron-clientelism in Jordan stands in the way of
intrinsic goods in order to sustain existing economic and political circumstances and the
leadership of the political elite. This was intended to represent the various ways— across
various fields— in which patron-clientelism excludes subalterns from the political
process and sustains the status quo. It has been argued that a value position is worth
taking on the subject of patron-clientelism in Jordan, and that the negative value
attributable to its prevalent manifestations today represents an opportunity for tomorrow.
The fourth chapter dove deep into the concepts of Antonio Gramsci and helped
provide a clearer understanding for civil society in Jordan. This was crucial as a
precondition to understanding behavior in civil society and how circumstance shapes
behavior. This section also was important to develop an understanding for the
relationship between economic circumstances and superstructural elements in society like
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institutions, norms and general cultural frames of mind. Related to the final section, this
discussion of Gramsci also demonstrated how economic evolution in Jordan will occur
only after institutions currently prevalent in civil society are realized to be insolvent.
The fifth and final chapter attempted to bring all of the conceptual themes
together, demonstrating how patron-clientelims is a salient force in civil society reflective
of the interests of the current hegemonic order. But the most important part of this thesis
came from the interview of Dr. Al-Deek. The experiences he had represented not only
what was wrong with institutions reflective of economic and political circumstances in
Jordan, as well as the interests of its political elite, but he also represented Jordan’s
opportunity. Rather than a basic representation of enthusiastic but fragmented
oppositional currents in Jordan, Dr. Al-Deek represents how the inevitable economic shift
in Jordan will carry with it a necessary reconfiguration of what patron-clientelism means
and how it shapes behavior.
So, despite earlier criticism about optimism for revolutionary behavior in
repressive political environments like Jordan, this thesis is itself optimistic. This is not
just because of the valiant and oppositional efforts by people like Dr. Al-Deek, but
because of the understanding developed here for the relationship between economic and
institutional factors in Jordanian society. It is likely that more Al-Deeks will emerge, but
it is even more likely that Jordan’s need for economic evolution will require it. Yes,
currently patron-clientelism represents a morally problematic and regressive institution in
Jordan’s civil society that generates and reinforces norms reflective of the interests of the
dominant fundamental social groups. But patron-clientelism also presents an opportunity,
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as it has the potential to one day reflect economic and political circumstances that are not
regressive and marginalizing.
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